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IS STATUTORY IMMUNITY FOR
SPACEFLIGHT OPERATORS GOOD
ENOUGH?
OF STATUTES, COMMON LAW, AND
EXCULPATORY PROVISIONS
Maria-Vittoria “Giugi” Carminati*
The phrase “assumption of risk” is an excellent illustration
of the extent to which uncritical use of words bedevils
the law. A phrase begins life as a literary expression; its
felicity leads to its lazy repetition; and repetition soon
establishes it as a legal formula, undiscriminatingly
used to express different and sometimes contradictory
ideas.
Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 292 (Fla. 1977).
The road to hell is paved with good intentions.
Proverb
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Introduction
Over the past decade, the commercial spaceflight industry has
seen a growth never witnessed before. The likes of Virgin Galactic
and Xcor are promising suborbital flights to anyone willing to pay the
price. Golden Spike is selling tickets to the moon. And SpaceX was
re-supplying the ISS as a commercial provider as of 2012. States have
responded to this growth by trying to make themselves more attractive
to these commercial providers of space services (hereinafter generally
referred to as “spaceflight entities”). Attractiveness has become
synonymous with overt efforts to decrease spaceflight entities’ liability
from injuries to their spaceflight participants (“SFPs”). As a result, six
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states (Virginia, New Mexico, Colorado, California, Texas and Florida,
or the “Space Friendly States”) have passed statutes limiting spaceflight
entities’ liability with respect to their customers (the “Space Activities
Statutes”). However, though the legislature may pass laws, the courts
must enforce them. This raises the following two overarching questions:
1) did the legislatures in the Space Friendly States actually decrease
spaceflight entities’ liability exposure by enacting the Space Activities
Statutes?; and 2) how robust is the common law of each state in limiting
liability for operators of recreational activities? These questions are
answered for each of the Space Friendly States below.
An analysis of statutes and case law limiting liability sits at the
crossroads between tort doctrine, social values and beliefs regarding
personal responsibility and fostering business, as well as “political
and economic interests on the determination of the types of risks that
are assumed and the allocation of accident costs when such risks lead
to injuries.”1 Much of the existing case law regarding statutes which
purport to limit liability focuses on the equine and ski industries.
Although this trajectory was dictated by the existence of equine
liability statutes (“ELAs”) and ski liability statutes (“SLAs”) are readily
comparable to Spaceflight Activity Statutes, these industries are similar
to the spaceflight industry in other ways. All three industries and their
related insurance industries “remain critically interested in how the
cost of [. . .] accidents is apportioned.”2 This interest has resulted in
legislatures enacting statutes to protect those industries. However, as
noted by scholars focusing on the skiing industry and illustrated below,
“courts have varied widely in their interpretation of the statutes.”3 In
some cases, like California, this has led to the curious result where
courts have accommodated plaintiffs despite the absence of protective
legislation.4 It is this surprising unintended consequence which drives
the inquiry below.
Part I explains the federal law related to SFPs as it provides color
and at times may significantly affect outcomes in courts applying state
law. Part I explains: a) the informed consent framework in the United
States Code (the “USC”) and b) the FAA’s implementation, by means
of regulations (the “Regulations”), of the informed consent framework
mandated by Congress. Part I also briefly addresses how liability is
apportioned at the national and international levels.
See Eric A. Feldman & Alison Stein, Assuming the Risk: Tort Law, Policy, and Politics on the Slippery
Slopes, 59 DePaul L. Rev. 259, 302 (2010).
2
Id. at 302 (discussing the skiing industry only).
3
Id.
4
See Feldman, supra note 1, at 302–03.
1
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Part II analyzes state law. Part II (A) provides context for the
Space Activities Statutes and identifies the categories of information
worthy of analysis. Part II (B) introduces statutes limiting liability
for equine and skiing activities. These statutes are most appropriate
for comparison to the Space Activities Statutes because they seek to
limit operators’ liability from risks inherent in dangerous recreational
activities. Part II (C) explains state law on express assumption of risk
(“EAR”), defined for these purposes as assumption of risk by contract.
Part II (D) introduces the doctrine of implied assumption of risk and
its two categories: primary assumption of risk (“PAR”) and secondary
assumption of risk (“SAR”). As a result, Part II (D) also establishes
standardized terms to refer to the various types of implied assumption
of risk.
Part III brings Parts I and II together. Part III(A)–(F) analyze each
of the Space Friendly States individually. For each state, the analysis
covers: 1) the Space Activity Statute, 2) statutes otherwise limiting
liability for recreational activities and resulting case law; 3) application
of EAR; and 4) application of implied assumption of risk. Part III looks
at how courts in each of the six states have interpreted the liability
limiting statutes, including trends to either limit or broaden their
application, and courts’ approaches to defining “inherent risks” under
the statutes. Part III also attempts to predict how courts in the Space
Friendly States will actually enforce the Space Activities Statutes, and
whether the legislatures have addressed any limitations courts are
likely to impose. The analysis of EAR looks at particular exculpatory
provisions and how courts have interpreted them. This delineates
the necessary criteria for an enforceable exculpatory clause in each
of the Space Friendly States, and whether the legislatures took these
into consideration when drafting the required “warning statements”
in their respective Space Activities Statutes. The analysis of implied
assumption of risk also attempts to predict how courts would apply
assumption of risk to claims by SFPs against spaceflight entities if
spaceflight entities cannot avail themselves of statutory immunity
under the Space Activities Statutes. This, in turn, indicates whether the
legislatures improved, worsened, or didn’t affect liability exposure for
spaceflight entities.
I. Federal Law
A. Regulation of Commercial Human
Spaceflight at the Federal Level
The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, codified as amended in

Vol. 6.1

Legislation & Policy Brief

39

Chapter 509 of Title 51 of the United States Code (the “Launch Act”),
authorizes the U.S. Department of Transportation (“DOT”) to issue
licenses for non-governmental space activities.5 Such licenses include
licenses to operate a launch site, to launch vehicles from Earth, and to
for space vehicles to reenter the Earth’s atmosphere from space.
The DOT is the lead agency for regulatory guidance pertaining to
commercial space transportation activities. However, the Secretary of
Transportation delegated commercial space licensing authority to the
Federal Airline Administration (“FAA”). As a result, the FAA, through
its Office of Commercial Space Transportation, is in charge of licensing
commercial launches, reentries, and the operation of launch and reentry
sites pursuant to the Launch Act.
In order to carry out its statutory duties, the FAA passed regulations
implementing the Launch Act. The relevant regulations are codified
at 14 C.F.R. Sections 415, 420, 431, and 435 (the “Regulations”). The
first FAA-licensed launch was a suborbital launch of the Starfire launch
vehicle on March 29, 1989. Since then, the FAA has licensed more than
200 launches and the operation of eight commercial spaceports.6 The
first FAA reentry license was issued in December 2011 to SpaceX for
reentry of the Dragon capsule.7
B. What is Federal Informed Consent?
The Launch Act and its implementing Regulations impose different
training, medical, and informed consent requirements for SFPs and
crew for commercial space activities. Under the Launch Act, “crew”
is any employee of a licensee or of a contractor or subcontractor of a
licensee “who performs activities in the course of that employment
directly relating to the launch, reentry, or other operation of or in a
launch vehicle or reentry vehicle that carries human beings.”8 An SFP
is “an individual, who is not crew, carried within a launch vehicle
or reentry vehicle.”9 The provider of space transportation services is
referred to as the “operator.” The term “spaceflight entity,” defined
above, encompasses “operator.” But for purposes of discussing federal
law, it is more precise to use the term operator.
Commercial Space Launch Act, Pub. L. No. 98-575, § 3, 98 Stat. 3055 (1984) (codified as amended
at 51 U.S.C. §§ 50901–50923 (2006)).
6
Launch Data and Information, Office of Commercial Space Transportation, Fed. Aviation Admin.,
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/launch_license/ (last visited Dec.
9, 2013).
7
Maria-Vittoria “Giugi” Carminati, Breaking Boundaries by Coming Home: The FAA’s Issuance of a
“Reentry License” to SpaceX, 24 Air & Space Law., no. 2, 2011, at 8.
8
51 U.S.C. § 50902(2) (2006).
9
Id. at § 50902(17).
5

40

Is Statutory Immunity for Spaceflight Operators
Good Enough?
1. SFPs

The Regulations do not create medical or training standards for
SFPs. This is consistent with the FAA’s overarching safety regime which
limits itself to protecting the safety of the general or uninvolved public.
In 2004, the FAA was given authority to create training and medical
standards for SFPs three years after the passage of Commercial Space
Launch Amendments Act (“CSLAA”)10. However, the FAA has yet to
do so. In addition, the Launch Act prohibits the FAA from proposing
regulations governing the design or operation of a launch vehicle to
protect the health and safety of crew and SFPs until October 1, 2015; or
until a design feature or operating practice has resulted in a serious or
fatal injury or contributed to an event that posed a high risk to crew or
SFPs during a licensed commercial human spaceflight.11
The Launch Act, however, does require that all SFPs provide
written informed consent to the technical risks of human spaceflight.
The Launch Act mandates that an operator may only launch or reenter
a space vehicle if the operator: (1) “informed the [SFP] in writing
about the risks of the launch and reentry, including the safety record
of the launch or reentry vehicle type;” (2) informed the SFP “that the
United States Government has not certified the launch vehicle as safe
for carrying crew or SFPs;” and (3) “the [SFP] has provided written
informed consent to participate in the launch and reentry.”12 The
Regulations further flesh out these statutory requirements.
Under the Regulations, before agreeing to fly an SFP an operator
must discuss the following six topics with the SFP: (1) the hazards
associated with sub-orbital flights generally, (2) the lack of safety
certification by the United States Government for carrying crew or
SFPs, (3) the safety record of launch and reentry vehicles generally, (4)
the safety record of the operators’ particular vehicle, (5) the availability
of additional information if the SFP desires it, and (6) an opportunity
for the SFP to ask additional questions.13 As part of the process, the
SFP must receive a written disclosure of the known hazards “that
could result in serious injury, death, disability, or total or partial loss of
physical and mental function” for each mission.14 Additionally, an SFP
must be informed in writing that there are unknown hazards and that
their participation in spaceflight may result in death, serious injury, or
10
11
12
13
14

Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 108-292, 118 Stat. 3974 (2004).
51 U.S.C. § 50905(c)(2)–(3), amended by Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 827, 126 Stat. 11 (2012).
51 U.S.C. § 50905.
14 C.F.R. § 460.45 (2013).
Id.
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total or partial loss of physical or mental function.15
When discussing the safety record of all launch or reentry vehicles,
an SFP must receive the following information: (1) the total number of
people who have been on a suborbital or orbital spaceflight and the total
number of people who have died or been seriously injured on these
flights, and (2) the total number of launches or reentries conducted
with people on board and the number of catastrophic failures of those
launches or reentries.
When describing the safety record of its vehicle to each SFP, the
operator’s safety record will include: (1) the number of vehicle flights,
(2) the number of accidents and human spaceflight incidents, and (3)
whether any corrective actions were taken to resolve these accidents
and human spaceflight incidents.
Lastly, an operator must inform the SFP that the SFP can ask for
additional information regarding accidents and human spaceflight
incidents. In the same context, the SFP must be given an opportunity
to ask additional questions. The final written consent must identify the
space launch vehicle it covers, state that the SFP understands the risk
and that their presence on board the vehicle is voluntary, and be signed
and dated by the SFP.
2. Crew
Unlike the detailed informed consent requirements for SFPs,
operators must only inform their crew that the U.S. Government has not
certified the launch and reentry vehicle as safe for carrying flight crew
or spaceflight participants.16 In addition, the Regulations’ notification
requirement requires only that an operator inform the crew that risks
exist, not that it identify all potential operational and design hazards.17
The Regulations mandate that each member of a flight crew and
any remote operator must execute a reciprocal waiver of claims with
the FAA.18 There are no such mandatory cross-waivers for the benefit
of licensed operators.19 The absence of mandatory cross-waivers means
that crew and operators are entitled to, and should, address issues of
liability contractually.20
Id.
14 C.F.R. § 460.9 (2007).
17
Id.
18
14 C.F.R. § 460.19 (2013).
19
M. Mineiro, Assessing the Risks: Tort Liability and Risk Management in the Event of a Commercial
Human Spaceflight Accident, 74 J. Air L. & Com. 392 (2008).
20
For an example of such cross-waivers, and possible contractual language, see App’x D, 14
15
16
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C. How Is Liability Handled at the Federal Level?

The “informed consent” procedure described above does not—as
one might expect—create the basis for immunizing the government
or the operator from liability for any injuries resulting from the space
activities. Rather, the United States requires the SFPs and the operators
to waive any claims against the U.S. Government, while leaving liability
between the SFP and the operator up to the parties. It is this gap that
state legislatures are attempting to fill. Further, in addition to liability
between SFPs and operators, operators could be subjected to thirdparty liability both internationally and domestically.
1. State-to-State Liability And Indemnification
at the International Level
At the international level, the United States is liable as a “launching
state” under the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention for
damage caused by space objects. If the United States is liable under
the Liability Convention it has a duty to indemnify other countries for
damage or injury to their property and to their nationals. The Liability
Convention defines “launching State” very broadly to potentially
include multiple States. A launching State is: (1) a State that launches
a space object; (2) a State that procures the launching of a space object;
(3) a State from whose territory a space object is launched; or (3) a State
from whose facility a space object is launched.21 Therefore, the United
States could be liable for damage caused to third-parties by a space
object if it meets any of the above criteria.
The Liability Convention also dictates the type of culpability used
to apportion fault. If damage is done to the surface of the Earth by a
space flight launch or reentry, the United States (or other launching
state) is absolutely liable under a theory of strict liability. If damage is
not on the Earth’s surface, i.e. in outer space, the Liability Convention
imposes negligence liability.22
Under the Liability Convention, the United States, and not
individual operators, is liable for damage to non-U.S. parties, even
if the space object was launched by a private U.S. operator without
participation (other than licensing) by the U.S. Government.23 However,
nothing prevents the United States from, in turn, seeking to recover
C.F.R. § 440 et seq.
21
Convention of International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects art. I, Mar. 29, 1972,
24.2 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187.
22
Convention of International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects art. III–IV.
23
Convention of International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects art. II.
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from the operators if one of the operators’ vehicles causes damage to a
third-party. In addition, the remedies under the Liability Convention
are non-exclusive, so international plaintiffs may still bring suit directly
against the U.S. operator foreign and domestic tort laws, analyzed
below. In order to be more competitive and assuage some commercial
concerns, the United States enacted a risk-sharing regime whereby it
will indemnify operators for damages above a certain cap.
2. Liability And Risk-Sharing at the U.S. National Level
The Launch Act addresses the apportionment of risk at the
national level.24 The Launch Act creates a risk-sharing mechanism
and requires execution of cross-waivers of liability for each licensed
launch or reentry.25 Under the no-fault reciprocal waivers of claims,
each party assumes responsibility for losses or injuries to itself and to
its employees.26 Additionally, each launch participant agrees to bear
their own losses.27
First, each licensee must execute a reciprocal waiver of claims
with the various commercial entities involved in the launch or
reentry activity, including the licensee’s contractors, subcontractors,
and customers, and their respective contractors and subcontractors.
Under this cross-waiver, each party must agree “to be responsible for
property damage or loss sustained or for personal injury to, death of,
or property damage or loss sustained by its own employees resulting
from an activity carried out under the applicable license.”28 Second, the
licensee, contractors, subcontractors, crew, SFPs, and customers of the
licensee must enter into a similar cross-waiver of claims with the U.S.
Government and its contractors and subcontractors, to the extent the
amount of the claims exceeds the amount of insurance the licensee is
required to obtain pursuant to its license.
As stated, the Launch Act requires crew and SFPs to waive claims
against the U.S. Government. However, nothing in the Launch Act
requires crew and SFPs to waive claims against the private parties
involved in the licensed or permitted activity, including the launch
provider, its contractors and subcontractors.29 These entities are
therefore not protected by federal law against claims by crew and SFPs,
51 U.S.C. § 50901.
Id. at § 50915.
26
Id. at § 50914(b).
27
Id.
28
51 U.S.C. § 50914(b)(1) (2006).
29
See, e.g., Timothy R. Hughes & Esta Rosenberg, Space Travel Law (and Politics): The Evolution of
the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004, 31 J. Space L. 1, 62–64 (2005).
24
25
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or their heirs, in the event of an accident. Liability that is not covered
by the Launch Act protections must instead by addressed by State
Space Activities Statutes, state common law, and contractual liability
allocation.
II. State Law
Only the six Space Friendly States have enacted laws that address
liability issues in commercial spaceflight activities, but others are sure to
follow in their footsteps. The following discussion analyzes state law in
the Space Friendly States—Texas, Colorado, California, Virginia, New
Mexico, and Florida—from four different perspectives: A) the language
of the Space Activities Statutes themselves; B) statutes immunizing
other activities and resulting case law; C) case law analyzing EAR; and
D) case law analyzing implied assumption of risk, divided into PAR
and SAR. These four perspectives, brought together, are currently the
best indicators of a spaceflight entity’s likely exposure to liability in the
six Space Friendly States, both with and without the Space Activities
Statutes.
A. Space Activities Statutes
The last few years have seen a tremendous development towards
potential commercial spaceflight. From Virgin Galactic to SpaceX and
XCOR, commercial companies are promising commercial flights for
common citizens willing to pay between $90,000 and $200,000 each
per flight. However, this relative commodification of spaceflight has
raised concerns about liability. The concern by spaceflight entities,
legislatures, and spaceflight enthusiasts is that SFP’s might attempt
to recover for injuries caused by spaceflight activities which resulted
from dangers that cannot be eliminated because of the perilous nature
of the activity itself.30 Even if spaceflight entities exercise all due care
and some risks simply cannot be eliminated particularly because of the
tremendous energy and speeds required to reach orbital or suborbital
trajectories as well as intense cold and rarified air typical of space
itself. Suborbital flights cannot exist without those risks. As a result of
these inherent risks, legislatures passed statutes limiting the liability of
spaceflight entities to assist and protect the fledgling industry.31
See, e.g., Sbandla, California Governor Signs the Spaceflight Liability and Immunity Act, Com.
Spaceflight Fed’n, available at http://www.commercialspaceflight.org/2012/09/californiagovernor-signs-the-spaceflight-liability-and-immunity-act/ (last accessed Nov. 20, 2013).
31
See, e.g., T. Hoover, Colorado Senate Bill Would Limit Spaceflight Companies’ Liability, The Denver
Post (Feb. 7, 2012, 1:00 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/legislature/ci_19907396; P. Alp, Limitations
on Liability As To Space Tourists, Tort Trial and Ins. Committee News (Summer 2011), available at
http://www.crowell.com/files/2011-Limitations-On-Liability-As-To-Space-Tourists.pdf.
30
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Virginia’s Space Flight Liability and Immunity Act of 200732 grants
conditional immunity from liability to companies providing human
spaceflight services in the event of an injury resulting from the risks
inherent in spaceflight. Virginia was the first state to enact such a
measure. Florida, New Mexico, Texas, Colorado, and California soon
followed Virginia’s lead and adopted similar legislation.33
The purpose of the limited liability laws is to create some security
that spaceflight companies will not be sued by SFPs or their heirs for
spaceflight activities undertaken at the SFPs’ own risk. Nevertheless,
the protection offered by the Florida, New Mexico, Virginia, California,
Colorado, and Texas laws is not absolute and provides immunity only
under certain circumstances. Consequently, the Space Activities Statutes
are referred to as providing limited liability rather than immunity. The
limitations imposed on immunity vary significantly from state to state.
These limitations vary not by virtue of the language of each of the
statutes, but by virtue of each jurisdiction’s judicial interpretation of
that statutory language.
B. Statutes Limiting Liability
Five of the six Space Friendly States already have statutes limiting
liability for certain activities. Colorado, Florida, New Mexico, and
Texas have statutes limiting liability for operators of equine activities
(“Equine Liability Acts” or “ELAs”). Colorado, New Mexico, and
Virginia have statutes limiting liability for operators and organizers of
skiing activities (“Ski Liability Acts” or “SLAs”). Judicial interpretation
and enforcement of these statutes may indicate how these same courts
will interpret and enforce space immunizing legislation, if and when
the time comes to do so. However, the ELAs and the SLAs are not
solely liability limiting statutes, which distinguishes them, across
the board, from the Space Activities Statutes. The latter were passed
to limit spaceflight entity liability in an effort to attract the various
companies to each enacting state respectively. The ELAs and the SLAs
have a more nuanced purpose. They usually list certain things ski
and equine operators are required to do. And they also often list skier
and equine participant responsibilities. This can, and should, always
serve as a way to distinguish the SLA/ELA frameworks from the Space
Activities Statutes, especially when courts take legislative intent into
consideration.
Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-227.10 (2007).
See Meredith Blasingame, Nurturing the United States Commercial Space Industry in an International
World: Conflicting State, Federal, and International Law, 80 MISS. L.J. 741 (2010) (showing an adoption
of limited liability legislation by Virginia, Florida, New Mexico, Texas, Colorado, and California).
32
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In several states, courts have to decide whether the injury to the
plaintiff was the result of the inherent danger of the activity before
deciding whether the operator is entitled to statutory immunity. If the
injury resulted from an inherent risk, the statute applies. If the injury
does not result from an inherent risk, the statute does not apply and
the parties must apply common law negligence. Though the concept
of “inherent risk” is determinative of whether there is immunity,
historically it has been hard to define. Scholars attribute the difficulty
of defining inherent risk to the fact that the term is not self-defining.
The idea of inherent risks is contested, in part because
the concept is not self-defining. In some cases, inherent
risks are defined as those that cannot be removed by
due care, whereas in other cases, courts imply that even
some risks that could be relatively easily remedied are
inherent in skiing.34
This is precisely the type of issue which will make the federal informed
consent, with its list of expected risks, so important at the state level.
Federal law requires a spaceflight operator to discuss the “hazards
associated with sub-orbital flights generally” to an SFP. What each
operator defines as “hazards associated with sub-orbital flights
generally” for purposes of informed consent will most likely have a
dramatic impact on any determination of immunity at the state level.
C. Express Assumption of Risk
Express assumption of risk, despite being used in torts, is a creature
of contract law. For EAR, the parties generally sign an exculpatory
agreement in the form of a statement, a waiver, a release, an assumption,
a warning or an agreement whereby the party incurring the risks
releases the other party from liability for injuries resulting therefrom.
Courts faced with these agreements find that they raise questions about
enforcing agreements that are the result of unequal bargaining power,
“The question raised by such cases is whether express agreements
should be enforced or whether the unequal bargaining power of the
parties negates the plaintiff’s consent, regardless of the plaintiff’s
awareness of certain dangers and apparent choice to confront them.”35
The warning statements in Space Activities Statutes will no doubt raise
the same issues thereby making courts’ construction of exculpatory
agreements relevant to determine whether the language required by
legislatures in the Space Activities Statutes is sufficient, on its own, to
34
35

Feldman, supra note 1, at 271–73.
Id.
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act as an exculpatory agreement.
EAR and its exculpatory provisions arise in court when defendants
are unable to avail themselves of statutes limiting their liability and
seek to enforce any warning statement signed by the plaintiff as an
exculpatory provision. The analysis is particularly appropriate here
because the Space Activities Statutes require spaceflight entities to
obtain a signed warning statement from SFPs. When other immunizing
statutes, such as SLAs and ELAs, require a signed warning defendants
who lose statutory immunity—either because the injury is not the result
of an inherent risk or because they breached the statutes—usually claim
EAR, and use the signed warning statements as proof of exculpation.
Spaceflight entities will likely do the same if, for some reason, the Space
Activities Statutes do not immunize them. In addition, a review of the
common law governing exculpatory agreements can guide spaceflight
entities’ drafting of exculpatory language in their contracts, thereby
further allowing them to protect themselves from liability. In the
future, such an analysis could also guide legislatures drafting warning
statements for the Space Activities Statutes.
There are five categories of information useful to an analysis of the
Space Activities Statutes warning statements:
1. Nature of the Document. Is the document a warning, an
acknowledgment, a release, or a consent?
2. Absence of Liability. What is the SFP immunizing the space
flight entity from? Inherent risks? Inherent injuries?
Something else?
3. Degree of Culpability. Does the document talk about the
degree of culpability? Gross negligence? Mere negligence?
4. Extent of Damages. Does the document list the types of
injuries for which the SFP may not recover under state law?
What do these include?
5. Informed Consent. Does the document refer to “informed
consent”? Does it incorporate federal informed consent
laws?
The formatting schemes (bold, italics, single underline, double
underline, and dashed underline) associated with each category
are used below to highlight corresponding language in the warning
statements and exculpatory provisions.
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D. Implied Assumption of Risk

Implied assumption of risk is a defense to common law negligence
claims. If spaceflight entities cannot use the Space Activities Statutes
(either because the incurred risk was not “inherent” or because they
violated the statute), and their arguments to enforce the warning
statements as “exculpatory agreements” fail, they will be left with
the defenses available at common law in the Space Friendly States,
which include the defense of implied assumption of risk. As discussed,
each of the six states enacted the Space Activities States against an
already-existing backdrop of negligence jurisprudence. The existence,
application, and enforcement of negligence concepts on operators will
be at the forefront of any litigation resulting from space activities. And
courts have, and will continue to grapple with the extent to which the
legislatures were trying to increase or decrease available common law
remedies when they promulgated the Space Activities Statutes. This is
where each legislature’s drafting should have taken into consideration
the common law world of negligence in their respective jurisdictions;
however, some legislatures did so only superficially.
Virginia, New Mexico, and California provide that the limitations
on legal liability afforded by the space immunity statutes are “in
addition” to any other limitations on liability available under state
law.36 Other states failed to address the issue altogether. The Texas,
Colorado, and Florida statutes do not specify whether the immunity
granted by the statute are in lieu of or in addition to already-existing
claims and defenses under state law.37
At the national level, up until the halfway through the 20th century
most states used a “contributory negligence” regime whereby negligence
by the plaintiff was a complete bar to her recovery.38 The “contributory
negligence” regime was slowly abandoned (only six states still apply
it) and replaced with “comparative negligence” where negligence is
apportioned and recovery is reduced by the amount attributable to
the plaintiff’s own negligence.39 Courts have since grappled with ways
to incorporate “assumption of risk” in the comparative negligence
regime.40 The main difficulty comes from the fact that declaring that
Cal. Civ. Code § 2212(d) (West 2013); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-14-3(C) (2013); Va. Code Ann.
§ 8.01-227.9(C) (2013).
37
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 41-6-101 (2013); Fla. Stat. § 331.501 (2012); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§ 100A.001 (West 2013).
38
Feldman, supra note 1, at 270.
39
Id.
40
See id. at 272 (describing the muddy waters of implied and express assumption of risk as
applied by the courts).
36
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a plaintiff “assumed the risk” harkens back to the abandoned theories
of “contributory negligence.” But failing to recognize that sometimes
plaintiffs do assume risks, whether reasonably or unreasonably, ignores
reality and undermines the tort dispute resolution system.41
Courts and scholars have used the term “assumption of risk” in
a variety of ways, creating confusion about its meaning. As noted
by scholars, “this seemingly simple legal concept has been freighted
with political and moral tensions for over a century, and it has been
attacked as ‘sinister’ and ‘dangerously misleading.’”42 As Justice Felix
Frankfurter insightfully noted:
The phrase “assumption of risk” is an excellent illustration
of the extent to which uncritical use of words bedevils
the law. A phrase begins life as a literary expression; its
felicity leads to its lazy repetition; and repetition soon
establishes it as a legal formula, indiscriminatingly
used to express different and sometimes contradictory
ideas.43
In light of this, and given that analysis herein spans six states, it is
inevitable that each state may have its own twist on the use of term.
In order to address this, it is best to start from the academic definitions
of “assumption of risk” as a standard and elaborate from there for
each state. At common law, there are two types of assumption of risk:
express and implied. Within implied, there are two subcategories:
primary assumption of risk and secondary assumption of risk.
Primary assumption of risk, or PAR, means that the operator has no
duty to the plaintiff. And such absence of duty is usually based on the
relationship between the parties. Further, subsumed in this concept of
“no duty” is often the idea that the defendant has no duty to decrease the
“inherent risks” of the activity because doing so would fundamentally
alter the nature of the activity. For example, a ski resort operator has
no duty to protect a skier from the inherent risks of skiing, such as
taking jumps and going downhill at high speeds. But it has a duty to
not increase the inherent risks of skiing by, for example, creating a
jump and negligently leaving a piece of snow plowing equipment in
the landing site. If the defendant did increase the inherent risks of an
activity, many courts proceed to application of “secondary assumption
of risk” or SAR.
41
42
43

Feldman, supra note 1, at 271–73.
Feldman, supra note 1.
Tiller v. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 68 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

50

Is Statutory Immunity for Spaceflight Operators
Good Enough?

SAR is when the operator does have a duty to the plaintiff, breached
that duty, but the plaintiff chose to go ahead with the activity that
resulted in the injury. Using the example above, the ski resort operator
breaches its duty by building a jump and negligently leaving a piece of
snow plowing equipment in the landing site. The plaintiff takes the jump
and injures herself. The plaintiff may or may not have known about
the snow plowing equipment. This is SAR and triggers a comparative
negligence analysis, comparing each of the parties’ negligence (if any)
and apportioning liability accordingly. These are generic definitions
and each state may vary them slightly, but the above descriptions are
mental constructs to broach the analysis.
III. State law in the Space Friendly States
While similar, the six Space Activities Statutes are not identical. The
most relevant features to compare and contrast the Space Activities
Statute are: 1) the definitions for: spaceflight entity, participant, and
spaceflight activity; 2) the harms for which the Space Activities Statute
provides immunity; 3) the spread of entities to which immunity
is granted; 4) the breadth of the immunity along the gradient of
culpability; 5) how the Space Activities Statutes describe the risks for
which immunity is granted; 6) what those entities have to do in order
to benefit from the immunity; and 7) consequences for failing to abide
by those requirements.
A. California
1. The Space Activities Statute
California is an outlier with respect to the scope of its Space Activities
Statute because it limits the definition of “spaceflight entity” solely to
the FAA license holder.44 The Space Activities Statute also expressly
excludes manufacturers of parts or components that proximately cause
injury to participants from the statute’s immunity.45 SFP is defined by
referring to and incorporating the definition of SFP from the Launch
Act.46 Likewise, California defines a spaceflight activity by merely
referring to, and adopting by reference, the definition of spaceflight
activities in the Launch Act.47
The California Space Activities Statute imposes an obligation on
the spaceflight operator to obtain “informed consent,” as that process
44
45
46
47

Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 2210(d) (2010).
Id. at § 2212(e).
Id. at § 2210(c).
Id.
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is defined by federal law, and have the SFP sign a statutorily mandated
warning statement.48 The California Space Activities Statute does not
impose obligations in addition to those imposed by federal law. If the
spaceflight operator complies with the informed consent requirements,
no one—whether next of kin, estate or participant themselves—is
authorized to bring a suit against or recover from a spaceflight entity
for “participant injury that resulted from the risks associated with
space flight activities . . . .”49 The California Space Activities Statute
therefore does not limit immunity to inherent risks of a spaceflight
activity. Rather, the California legislature adopted the broader term
“risks associated with spaceflight activities.”50
California provides no immunity if a spaceflight entity commits
an act or omission that constitutes either gross negligence or willful
or wanton disregard for an SFP’s safety.51 In addition, California does
not provide immunity if the space flight entity knows or has reason to
know of the dangerous condition that proximately causes the injury.52
In other California statutes, the expression “knows or has reason to
know” refers to “wanton or willful misconduct.”53 There is no California
case law referring to the standard as representing mere negligence.
Lastly, the California Space Activities Statute does not give spaceflight
entities immunity for intentional acts.54
2. Statutes Limiting Liability
California sits on one end of the spectrum with respect to statutes
limiting liability for operators of recreational activities. Aside from
the Space Activities Statute, California does not have a single other
statute limiting liability for organizers and operators of particular
activities. Thus, when the legislature passed its Space Activities Statute
it was enacting a first-of-its-kind law. However, the legislature did not
provide spaceflight entities any more protection than they would have
had at common law under this statute.
California courts have been markedly pro-defendant in cases
Id. at § 2212(a).
Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 2212(b).
50
Id. at § 2212(a).
51
Id. at. § 2212(c).
52
Id.
53
Henry J. Kaiser Co. v. Indus. Acc. Comm’n, 185 P.2d 353, 358 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947) (“The test
whether an act is willful misconduct as used in section 4553 is not that the employer knew that
the act would, and intended that it should, harm an employee, but rather that the employer or his
managing official representative knew or should have known that the performance of the act or its
omission was likely to cause harm to an employee.”).
54
Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 2212(c).
48
49
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between injured skiers and ski resort operators for many years. In
fact, scholars have noted that California courts, even in the absence of
statues immunizing defendants, have developed tremendously prodefendant jurisprudence:
Why have the California courts, in the
absence of a statute that codifies the
assumption of risk doctrine, embraced a
common law approach to assumed risk
that is more favorable to defendants than
the most narrowly tailored legislation?55
This is even more surprising given that the reverse is true in states
with specifically-tailored pro-industry legislation.56 As a result, the
California legislature’s decision to enact the California Space Activities
Statute is not necessarily a benefit to spaceflight entities.
3. Express Assumption of Risk
Under California law, exculpatory agreements in the recreational
sports context do not implicate the public interest and are therefore not
void as being against public policy.57 Further, a party can prospectively
exculpate itself for its own negligence or misconduct.58 But such a
release has to be “clear, unambiguous, and explicit in expressing the
intent of the subscribing parties” though “[t]he release need not achieve
perfection.”59 When reviewing the language of a release, courts will find
an ambiguity when a party can identify an “alternative, semantically
reasonable, candidate of meaning of a writing.”60 Ambiguities as to the
release’s scope are normally construed against the drafter.61
As discussed above, California does not have ELAs, SLAs, or other
statutes comparable to the Space Activities Statute. Given the absence
of an ELA or an SLA, the best approach to predict what courts will do
with the Space Activities’ Statute warning statement is to compare it
to other exculpatory provisions independently drafted by parties and
subsequently interpreted by California courts.

Feldman, supra note 1, at 298.
Id. Speculation as to the reason behind this correlation is beyond the scope of this analysis,
significant evidence of this trend is supported by case law.
57
Cohen v. Five Brooks Stable, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471, 478 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (internal citation
omitted).
58
Id. at 478.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
55
56
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The California Space Activities Statute refers to the SFP’s
understanding and acknowledgment of inherent risks, and broadly
defines the latter as “death, emotional injury, and property damage”:
WARNING AND
ACKNOWLEDGMENT:
I understand and acknowledge that,
under California law, there is limited
civil liability for bodily injury, including
death, emotional injury, or property
damage, sustained by a participant as a
result of the inherent risks associated with
space flight activities provided by a space
flight entity. I have given my informed
consent to participate in space flight
activities after receiving a description of
the inherent risks associated with space
flight activities, as required by federal
law pursuant to Section 50905 of Title
51 of the United States Code and Section
460.45 of Title 14 of the Code of Federal
Regulations. The consent that I have
given acknowledges that the inherent
risks associated with space flight activities
include, but are not limited to, risk of bodily
injury, including death, emotional injury,
and property damage. I understand and
acknowledge that I am participating in
space flight activities at my own risk.
I have been given the opportunity to
consult with an attorney before signing
this statement.62
Note the dissonance between the statute and the warning statements.
Under the statute, spaceflight operators are given immunity for,
“participant injury that resulted from the risks associated with space
flight activities . . . .”63 But the warning statement refers to the SFP’s
understanding and acknowledgment of “inherent risks.” Unfortunately,
courts will have to resolve this ambiguity, a product of poor drafting.
Additionally, there is no legislative history to provide insight about

62
63

Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 2211(a) (2013) (emphasis added).
Id. at § 2212(b) (emphasis added).
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any intentional causes for the discrepancy.64 There is also no case law
addressing this type of situation, making this a case of first impression
in California.
An enforceable release must be clear, explicit, and comprehensible
enough for a lay person to understand they are releasing the operator
for the operator’s own negligence.65 This does not mandate the use of the
word “negligence” or any particular verbiage. For example, in a 2008
California Court of Appeals decision, the word negligence appeared
once in the release at issue, but it was used to refer to the plaintiff’s
negligence: “The word ‘negligence’ is used but once, and in a way that
refers only to appellant’s negligence, not that of respondent.”66 Further,
the release needs to “inform the releasor that it applie[s] to misconduct
on the part of the releasee.”67 The Space Activities Statute purports to
immunize a spaceflight entity for its own negligence. But the warning
statement does not explicitly say that. Nor does it indicate, implicitly or
explicitly, the scope of culpability encompassed. The warning statement
refers to “inherent risks” as including, but not being limited to, “bodily
injury, including death, emotional injury, and property damage.”68
What the warning statement does not say is whether these risks include
the spaceflight operator’s negligence.
Third, with regards to the negligent act being exonerated, the
express terms of the release must apply to the defendant’s particular
negligence, but the release does not have to include every possible
specific act of negligence.69 For example, if a plaintiff releases a defendant
of “all liability” then the release also applies to “any negligence of the
defendant.”70 The only qualifier is that the particular negligence had to
be “reasonably related to the object or purpose for which the release
is given.”71 And when a release expressly releases the defendant from
liability, the plaintiff does not need to have had “specific knowledge
of the particular risk that ultimately caused the injury.”72 This is
theoretically a generous reading of release language and it should give
parties broad latitude in limiting an operator’s exposure. However,
despite these generous standards, California courts have sometimes
See Cal. Assembly Journal, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess., No. 243 (Aug. 28, 2012); Cal. Leg., S. Daily
Journal, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess., at 199th Legislative Day (May 10, 2012).
65
Cohen, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 481 (emphasis added) (citing Ferrell v. S. Nev. Off–Rd. Enthusiasts, Ltd.,
195 Cal. Rptr. 90, 96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
66
Id.
67
Id. (citing Sanchez v. Bally’s Total Fitness Corp., 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 902, 904 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
68
Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 2211(a).
69
Cohen, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 478 (citations omitted).
70
Id.
71
Id. (citations omitted).
72
Id. (citation omitted).
64
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refused to enforce language that is seemingly in compliance with
the above requirements.73 In addition, the Space Activities Statute’s
warning statement does not speak in terms of “release of liability.”
Rather, it reflects the SFP’s consent to the risks “inherent in spaceflight.”
But it does not release or waive claims against the spaceflight entity.
Spaceflight entities therefore would have to supplement the warning
statement with language that complies with the California courts’
judicially pronounced requirements for exculpatory provisions.
Further, although California courts will find that release of “all
liability” encompasses spaceflight entities’ negligence, the Space
Activities Statute does not use that language. In fact, the “Warning
and Acknowledgment” merely says there is “limited civil liability”
(highlighted in italics above) for injuries inherent in spaceflight
activities – a far cry from releasing a spaceflight entity for “all liability.”
Fourth, at common law, for purposes of exculpatory provisions,
whether the injury-causing risk is “inherent” is irrelevant under
California law, because the only thing that matters is whether the risk
incurred is within the scope of the provision.74 California courts do not
inquire about “inherent risks” when analyzing a release because what
matters is the scope of the release. But the warning and acknowledgment
provided by the legislature expressly limits itself to “inherent risks”
despite the Space Activities Statute purportedly granting immunity for
risks “associated” with spaceflight activities. As a result, spaceflight
entities cannot rely on the warning statement language to act as an
exculpatory provision if the Space Activities Statute does not apply.
Fifth, if there are two reasonable interpretations of its language,
a release is ambiguous. Given the basic canon of construction that
ambiguities are resolved against the drafter of the instrument,
ambiguities cannot be construed in the defendant’s favor.75 In Vine
v. Bear Valley the plaintiff, a ski resort employee, was injured while
snowboarding.76 The defendant moved for summary judgment based
on a release the plaintiff signed when she received her employee season
pass.77 The relevant terms of the release were as follows:
I understand and am aware that skiing
is a HAZARDOUS ACTIVITY involving
See infra Section IV(A)(3) (citing and analyzing cases to that effect).
Cohen, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 478 (citation omitted).
75
Cohen, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 480 (citing Benedek v. PLC Santa Monica, LLC, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197,
202 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)).
76
Vine v. Bear Valley Ski Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 370, 378 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
77
Id. at 378.
73
74
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INHERENT AND OTHER RISKS of
injury to any and all parts of my body.
I further understand that injuries in the
sport are a COMMON AND ORDINARY
OCCURRENCE, and I freely ACCEPT
AND ASSUME ALL RISKS OF INJURY
OR DEATH that might be associated
with my participation in this sport.
. . . To the fullest extent allowed by law,
I agree to RELEASE FROM LIABILITY,
and to INDEMNIFY AND HOLD
HARMLESS Bear Valley Mountain
Resort . . . from any and all liability on
account of, or in any way resulting from,
personal injuries, death or property
damage, even if caused by NEGLIGENCE, in
any way connected with my participation
in this sport. I further AGREE NOT
TO MAKE A CLAIM OR SUE FOR
INJURIES OR DAMAGES in any way
connected with my participation in this
sport, even if caused by NEGLIGENCE.78

The Court of Appeals held the release ambiguous because “‘skiing’
does not necessarily include snowboarding.”79 In addition, the plaintiff
in Vine was injured after the close of the season during an event
organized by her employer.80 The Court of Appeals also held that a
reference in the pass to the 1999–2000 “season” did not unambiguously
apply to the plaintiff’s injuries, because the employee event took
place after the slopes closed for the season.81 Such strict construction
of exculpatory agreements should raise concerns among spaceflight
entities and encourage extremely careful—and broad—drafting. This
case certainly indicates a spaceflight entity’s need to supplement the
warning statement provided by the Space Activities Statute.
Sixth, the release must encompass the particular injury suffered by
the plaintiff. In 2008 a California court of appeals decided Cohen v. Five
Brooks Stable, where the plaintiff was injured when she fell from a horse
during a guided trail ride provided by the defendant.82 The defendant
78
79
80
81
82

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Cohen, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 474.
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moved for summary judgment based on PAR and on the “Visitor’s
Acknowledgment of Risk” signed by the plaintiff. The exculpatory
provision released liability for risks “not specifically identified
herein.”83 The Court of Appeals had to decide whether this phrase
only exculpated the operator for the inherent risks of horseback riding
or whether it included the risk of the defendant’s own misconduct
which increased the inherent risks.84 The Court of Appeals found
the language referring to risks “not specifically identified herein”
fatally ambiguous85 because “risks not specifically identified” could—
reasonably—refer to the risks inherent in horseback riding that were left
unidentified by the phrase “some, but not all.”86 But the words could
also refer to risks arising out of the operator’s negligence that increase
the inherent risks.87 Then court concluded that such an interpretation
would be “semantically reasonable.”88 Therefore, given the existence
of two reasonable interpretations, the release was held ambiguous and
had to be construed against the drafter of the instrument, the operator.89
Seventh, under California law an exculpatory provision only
applies to entities that are parties to it.90 The legislature did not address
this issue at all in its warning language. This is likely a willful omission
given that the California Space Activities Statute expressly excludes
any entity other than the spaceflight entity from its limited liability.
Spaceflight entities drafting exculpatory agreements should be mindful
of this and find ways to include every entity they wish to protect in
their language.
To conclude, although California courts do not view exculpatory
provisions as contrary to public policy and approve of exculpatory
provisions releasing a party for their own future negligence, spaceflight
entities should not rely solely on the Space Activities Statute warning as
a standalone exculpatory provision. Overall, the legislature could have
drafted language that is clear, explicit, and comprehensible enough
for a lay SFP to understand it is releasing the spaceflight entity from
liability for its own negligence. This is especially true given California
courts’ aggressive interpretation of ambiguities, as exemplified by Vine.
The provided “Warning and Acknowledgment” statement creates a
very narrow exculpation provision; indeed, it exculpates less behavior
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Id. at 478.
Id.
Id. at 480.
Cohen, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 479.
Id.
Id. (citing Benedek v. PLC Santa Monica, LLC, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197, 203 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)).
Id.
Moser v. Ratinoff, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 198, 202–03 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
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than is immunized under the Space Activities Statute itself.
4. Implied Assumption of Risk
Under California law, there are two types of implied assumption of
risk: PAR and SAR.91 Under PAR—where the defendant owes no duty
to protect the plaintiff—a plaintiff is not entitled to recover from the
defendant, whether the plaintiff’s conduct in undertaking the activity
was reasonable or unreasonable.92 In fact, the plaintiff’s reasonableness
or subjective beliefs are also not part of the equation.93 Under SAR—
involving instances in which the defendant breaches a duty of care
owed to the plaintiff—the defendant is not entitled to be entirely
relieved of liability for an injury proximately caused by such breach,
simply because the plaintiff’s conduct in encountering the risk of such
an injury was reasonable rather than unreasonable.94 For these reasons,
California courts do not rely on the distinction between a plaintiff’s
reasonable or unreasonable actions because, “use of the ‘reasonable
implied assumption of risk’/’unreasonable implied assumption of risk’
terminology, as a means of differentiating between the cases in which a
plaintiff is barred from bringing an action and those in which he or she
is not barred, is more misleading than helpful.”95
PAR applies to co-participants, organizers and operators, which
makes it readily applicable to suits by SFPs or their families against
spaceflight entities.96 And under PAR, a defendant has no duty to
eliminate (or protect plaintiffs) from risks inherent in the sport itself,
although the defendant does have a duty to not increase the risks
specific to the activity.97 The overriding consideration in determining
whether PAR should apply to an activity is whether “imposing a duty
[. . .] might chill vigorous participation in the implicated activity and
thereby alter its fundamental nature.”98 Indeed, the object of PAR is
“to avoid recognizing a duty of care when to do so would tend to
alter the nature of an active sport or chill vigorous participation in
Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 701, 709 (Cal. 1992).
Id. at 703–04.
93
Id. at 709.
94
Id. at 703–04.
95
Id.
96
Amezcua v. Los Angeles Harley-Davidson, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 567, 577 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (citing
Ford v. Gouin, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 30 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)).
97
Knight, 834 P.2d at 708 (citing Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation, Liability for Injury or Death From
Ski Lift, Ski Tow, or Similar Device, 95 A.L.R.3d 203 (1979)); Vine v. Bear Valley Ski Co., 13 Cal. Rptr.
3d 370, 380 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Branco v. Kearny Moto Park, Inc., 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 392
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995)); Van Dyke v. S.K.I. Ltd., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 775, 779 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
98
Moser v. Ratinoff, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 198, 203 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Ferrari v. Grand Canyon
Dories, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65, 67).
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the activity.”99 Spaceflight entities could make a compelling argument
that placing too many restrictions on an activity that consists of people
being thrust into suborbital trajectories, reaching speeds of 1.4 km/s,
being “weightless” for 3–6 minutes, and returning to earth would be
“chilling.” This is further strengthened by California courts’ position
that whether a duty exists is contingent on the nature of the activity
and not the relationship of the parties. If the defendant does breach its
duty to the plaintiff and increases the risks inherent in the sport, the
analysis switches from PAR to SAR, which requires an apportionment
of liability under comparative fault principles.100
However, as noted above PAR does not entail “unbridled legal
immunity.”101 Rather, there still remains a “duty to use due care not
to increase the risks to a participant over and above those inherent in the
sport.”102 For example, drinking alcoholic beverages is not an activity
inherent in the sport of skiing.103 On the other hand, “in various sports,
going too fast, making sharp turns, not taking certain precautions, or
proceeding beyond one’s abilities are actions held not to be totally
outside the range of ordinary activities involved in those sports.”104 In
contrast, under PAR, a plaintiff’s suit will not be barred if a defendant’s
actions are found to be “totally outside the range of ordinary activities
involved.”
In Cohen v. Five Brooks Stable, the plaintiff sued a stable based on a
horseback riding accident allegedly caused by a trail guide suddenly
increasing his pace, thereby encouraging the plaintiff’s horse to do the
same, causing her to fall.105 The court reversed summary judgment
for the plaintiff and held PAR did not apply because “the conduct of
respondent’s trail guide was ‘so reckless as to be totally outside the range
of the ordinary activity involved in the sport’ in which appellant was
engaged.”106 The court added, “[a] spooked horse that throws a rider
may be a horse acting as a horse, but a trail guide who unexpectedly
provokes a horse to bolt and run without warning its rider is not in our
opinion a ‘trail guide acting as a trail guide.’”107
Cohen v. Five Brooks Stable, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471, 489 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Kahn v. E. Side
Union High Sch. Dist., 75 P.3d 30, 43 (2003)).
100
Knight, 834 P.2d at 712; Bush v. Parents Without Partners, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 178, 181 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993).
101
Moser, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 205.
102
Id. (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).
103
Id. at 206 (citing Freeman v. Hale, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 418, 423 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)).
104
Id. at 206 (citing Cheong v. Antablin, 946 P.2d 817, 820 (Cal. 1997)).
105
Cohen v. Five Brooks Stable, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471, 474–75 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
106
Id. at 486 (citing Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 711 (Cal. 1992)).
107
Id. at 484 (internal quotation marks omitted).
99
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Determining whether a risk is inherent is a complicated inquiry
with undefined contours. One California court held that “whether a
particular risk is an inherent part of an activity ‘is necessarily reached
from the common knowledge of judges, and not the opinions of
experts.’”108 The same court defined inherent risks as, “the risks inherent
in the sport not only by virtue of the nature of the sport itself, but also by
reference to the steps the sponsoring business entity reasonably should
be obligated to take in order to minimize the risks without altering the
nature of the sport.”109 In Amezcua v. Los Angeles Harley-Davidson, the
court concluded that closing freeways to other traffic during the ride
would alter the parade-like nature of riding in a motorcycle procession
on a public highway.110 Under those circumstances, PAR barred
recovery from Harley-Davidson, the defendant.111 In Nalwa the court
held PAR applicable to bumper cars in part because doing otherwise
would destroy the activity.112 Similarly, spaceflight entities can argue
that suborbital flights are simply impossible if certain attributes, such
as rapid acceleration, placing people in weightlessness, leaving the
Earth’s atmosphere, and potentially exposing passengers to the risks
associated with reentry into Earth’s atmosphere, are eliminated. Suits
for injuries arising from those and any other necessary elements of a
suborbital flight should therefore be barred under California’s PAR
doctrine.
California courts will apply PAR to an activity if it, “is done for
enjoyment or thrill, requires physical exertion as well as elements of
skill, and involves a challenge containing a potential risk of injury.”113
Thus in the sports context duty is fashioned “in the process [of] defining
the risks inherent in the sport not only by virtue of the nature of the
sport itself, but also by reference to the steps the sponsoring business
entity reasonably should be obligated to take in order to minimize the
risks without altering the nature of the sport.”114 The court went on to
note that the rule seemed to only apply “in a potentially dangerous
activity or sport.”115
California courts will also apply PAR to an activity that, “entails
some pitting of physical prowess (be it strength based [i.e., weight
Amezcua v. Los Angeles Harley-Davidson, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 567, 580 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
Id. (internal citation omitted).
110
Id. at 581.
111
Id.
112
Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, 290 P.3d 1158, 1164 (Cal. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113
Moser, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 205 (citing and quoting Record v. Reason, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547, 554
(Cal. Ct. App. 1999)). See Bush v. Parents Without Partners, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 178, 181 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993) (citing Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 709 (Cal. 1992)).
114
Bush, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 181.
115
Id. (citations omitted).
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lifting], or skill based, [i.e., golf]) against another competitor or against
some venue.”116 In Shannon v. Rhodes a California court concluded that
being a passenger in a boat was “too benign” to be subject to PAR.117 In
Beninati v. Blackrock City, another appellate court added a twist to the
standard by holding that where an activity has an “obvious risk,” this
will also weigh in favor of applying PAR.118 In Beninati, the plaintiff
was at the Burning Man Festival. He approached the ceremonial fire
to participate in the festivities and burnt himself. The court found that
“[t]he risk of injury to those who voluntarily decide to partake in the
commemorative ritual at Burning Man is self-evident. . . . [T]he risk
of stumbling on buried fire debris . . . was an obvious and inherent
one,”119 and therefore PAR applied.
California courts have used and refined the standard to determine
which activities are subject to PAR, applying PAR to activities as varied
as motorcycle riding, bicycle riding, and waterskiing.120 In fact, PAR has
been applied to: snow skiing, water skiing, touch football, collegiate
baseball, off-roading, skateboarding, golf, lifeguard training, tubing
behind a motorboat, wrestling, gymnastics stunt during cheerleading,
little league baseball, cattle roundup, sport fishing, ice skating, football
practice drill, judo, rock climbing, river rafting, and sailing.121 PAR
explicitly does not apply to a boating passenger and recreational
dancing.122 Some more recent California decisions have altered the
standard yet again, holding that PAR applies to activities which involve
“inherent risk of injury to voluntary participants . . . where the risk
cannot be eliminated without altering the fundamental nature of the
activity.123 This exact standard has since been repeated approvingly,
notably in 2011 in Amezcua.124
SFPs currently go through fairly rigorous physical training
(including centrifuge testing),and subject themselves to significant
forces, as well as potentially to the atmospheric rigors of suborbital
trajectories,125 thereby indicating that suborbital flying will at least
be considered for inclusion as an “activity” worthy of PAR. Also,
Amezcua, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 577.
Id. (citing Shannon v. Rhodes, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 217, 221 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)).
118
Beninati v. Black Rock City, LLC, 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 105, 111 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
119
Id. at 659.
120
Moser v. Ratinoff, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 198, 205, 208 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (internal citations omitted).
121
Moser, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 204–05 (citations omitted).
122
Id.
123
Beninati, 96 Cal.Rptr.3d at 109.
124
Amezcua, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 577.
125
See, e.g., Melchor Antunano, Medical Considerations for Manned Commercial Spaceflight, FAA
Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (Oct. 26, 2004), available at http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/
headquarters_offices/ast/advisory_committee/meeting_news/media/2004/october/Antunano.ppt.
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spaceflight entities can take solace that certain activities, such as
going “too fast,” or pushing the boundaries, could be considered risks
inherent of the activity, thereby not giving rise to liability.
Lastly, under California law, PAR is per se not a proper subject
for jury instruction. The California Supreme Court has made it clear
that whether PAR negates a defendant’s duty to protect the plaintiff
from a particular risk is a legal determination to be made by the court,
not the jury.126 This makes the matter suitable for summary judgment
disposal.127
California’s jurisprudence, as exemplified above, is expansive
and generally protective of operators and organizers of recreational
activities. The trend is confirmed in skiing cases, which generally protect
the ski industry. The trend is so marked, in fact, that scholars have
noted how surprising it is given the absence of legislation specifically
protecting the industry:
Perhaps surprisingly, in the absence of the
codification of assumed risk and without
a clear statement from the legislature
about the importance of shielding the ski
industry from liability, California courts
have been more vigorous in shielding the
ski industry from liability than those in
either Vermont or Colorado.128
California case law about skiing is helpful because it illustrates
how courts can be protective of an industry without legislative
intervention.129 If recreational operators fare better in states where
there are no legislative attempts to protect them, this begs the question
of whether the six Space Activities Statutes have aided, hindered, or
merely reflect status quo for the industry.
The California Space Activities Statute does say that it is meant
to supplement already-existing limits on liability, “[a]ny limitation
Vine v. Bear Valley Ski Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 370, 381 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Knight v.
Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 706 (Cal. 1992); Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 75 P.3d 30, 38 (Cal.
2003)); Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, 290 P.3d 1158, 1164 (Cal. 2012).
127
See Nalwa, 290 P.3d at 1164 (citing Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383, 393–94 (Cal.
2006); Kahn, 75 P.3d at 43–44, 47; Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 248 P.3d 1170, 1177 n.5 (Cal.
2011) (court may consult published material on legal questions, including existence of a tort duty,
without formally taking judicial notice)).
128
Feldman, supra note 1, at 292–96.
129
Danieley v. Goldmine Ski Assocs., 266 Cal. Rptr. 749, 750–51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Connelly v.
Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855, 857 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
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on legal liability afforded by this section to a space flight entity is in
addition to any other limitations of legal liability otherwise provided
by law.”130 This statement was presumably an attempt at prophylaxis,
but its effect is unclear. The statement assumes there are inferior means
to limit liability and that a spaceflight entity should be able to avail itself
of those means as well as those in the statute. However, the common
law regime for limiting liability of recreational operators is far superior
to the Space Activities Statute. The two, in fact, don’t operate together.
Recovery must be under either one or the other. So, the legislature’s
“savings clause” seems to have no practical impact on liability exposure.
Spaceflight entities will have to untangle the meaning of the phrase
when defending themselves against claims. Given the state of PAR,
spaceflight entities may be better off without the statute than with it.
In fact, this is true for manufacturers of recreational equipment,
which the legislature expressly excluded from the Space Activities
Statute. Because the statute excludes manufacturers from its liability
regime, manufacturers can only rely on common law. California
common law applies PAR to manufacturers of recreational equipment.131
Under California law, a recreational equipment manufacturer has a
narrower duty “to not increase the particular sport’s inherent risks”
or a duty to take “reasonable steps to minimize the particular sport’s
inherent risks while not altering the nature of the sport.”132 This is the
PAR standard.
A manufacturer’s duty hinges on the definition of “inherent risk”
for the particular sport at issue.133 An inherent risk is “a risk that, ‘if
eliminated, would fundamentally alter the nature of the sport or deter
vigorous participation.’”134 In Altman v. HO Sports Co., Inc., a case about
a wakeboarding accident, the plaintiff had introduced evidence that the
boot increased the inherent risk of ankle fracture because it created “an
unsupported hinge at the weakest point of the lower extremities.”135
Because this evidence suggested an increase in the inherent risk, the
California district court denied summary judgment on the theory of
PAR.136 The Space Activities Statute expressly excludes manufacturers
from its codification of PAR for spaceflight activities. Therefore, when
the California legislature passed the Space Activities Statute, it actually
offered fewer protections than were available to manufacturers of
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

Cal. Civ. Code § 2212(d).
Altman v. HO Sports Co., 821 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1183 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
Id. at 1191 (citing Ford v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215, 227 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)).
Id. at 1191.
Id. at 1191 (citing Polaris Indus., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 227).
Id. at 1196.
Altman, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 1196.
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spaceflight equipment. To that end, manufacturers may be grateful
they were excluded from the Space Activities Statute, because it means
they can rely on the existing common law.
Under California law, spaceflight entities can raise the PAR defense.
PAR is advantageous because it allows for dismissal of an SFP’s
action at summary judgment. In fact, as discussed above, California
courts have generally taken pro-defendant positions (notably for ski
operators) in the absence of statutes protecting those defendants. Given
the existence of PAR, California’s Space Activities Statute did very little
to decrease spaceflight entities’ exposure. As it turns out, the excluded
manufacturers at common law are actually more protected than the
spaceflight entities under the statute.
B. Colorado
1. Space Activities Statute
The Colorado Space Activities Statute is unique because it has a
legislative declaration of purpose. The legislative purpose lists reasons
the spaceflight industry would benefit from Colorado’s particular
attributes (e.g. “Colorado’s mile-high altitude affords significant
advantages for spaceport activities”) and reasons Colorado would
benefit from the spaceflight industry (e.g. job and business creation).137
Based on a laundry list of mutual advantages, the General Assembly
announced its support of “horizontal spaceflight activities in Colorado”
by “recognizing” that spaceflight entities and people who help foster
spaceflight activities are entitled to some protection from liability, in
that they “should reasonably expect some degree of protection in the
event of an accident that might occur as a result of the inherent dangers
of spaceflight.”138
In Colorado the term “space flight entity” includes the FAA
license holder as well as manufacturers and suppliers reviewed by
the FAA during the licensing process.139 The definition of participant
incorporates by reference the Launch Act’s term SFP.140 Colorado also
adopts the definition of spaceflight activities as defined in the Launch
Act wholesale.141
Colorado requires compliance with the federal informed consent
137
138
139
140
141

S.B. 12-035, 2012 Leg., Ch. 126 § 1(1)(b), (f), (g) (Colo. 2012).
Colo. S. Ch. 126 § 1(1)(2).
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 41-6-101(1)(b) (2013).
Id. at § 41-6-101(1)(c).
Id. at § 41-6-101(1)(a).
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process and SFP signature of a statutorily mandated warning
statement.142 But it immunizes spaceflight entities for liability arising
out of “injury to or death of a spaceflight participant resulting from
the inherent risks of spaceflight activities . . . .”143 Colorado therefore
incorporates the concept of “inherent risk.” It does not, however, define
the “inherent risks” of spaceflight activities.
Colorado provides no immunity if a spaceflight entity commits
an act or omission that constitutes either gross negligence or willful
or wanton disregard for an SFP’s safety.144 In addition, the Colorado
Space Activities Statute does not provide immunity if the space flight
entity knows or has reason to know of the dangerous condition that
proximately causes the injury.145 In Colorado, in other contexts, the
term “knows or has reason to know” describes “wanton conduct,”146 or
“wanton and reckless disregard.”147 The Space Activities Statute does
not provide immunity for intentional acts.148
2. Statutes Limiting Liability
a. Equine Activities
Under Colorado law, interpretation of statutes is a question of
law.149 Any statute providing immunity, whether it be to government
entities or equine operators, is strictly construed.150 Colorado is a state
ripe with case law because it has statutes immunizing operators and
organizers for both equine and skiing injuries. This section will first
look at the ELA and then at the SLA. Colorado courts enforce both
statutes narrowly, resulting in pro-plaintiff decisions. If the courts
similarly approach the Space Activities Statute, they may well render
the Colorado legislature’s promise an empty one.
The ELA and the Space Activities Statute have several similarities.
The ELA limits operators’ liability for injuries that results from certain
inherent risks of equine activities because the state and its citizens
derive economic and personal benefits from equine activities.151 This
is also the case for the Space Activities Statute. The ELA did not create
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151

Id. at § 41-6-101(2).
Id.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 41-6-101(2)(b).
Id. at § 41-6-101(2)(b).
Miller v. Solaglas California, Inc., 870 P.2d 559, 568 (Colo. App. 1993) (citations omitted).
Tri-Aspen Const. Co. v. Johnson, 714 P.2d 484, 486 (Colo. 1986).
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 41-6-101(2)(b).
Fielder v. Acad. Riding Stables, 49 P.3d 349, 350 (Colo. App. 2002).
Clyncke v. Waneka, 157 P.3d 1072, 1077 (Colo. 2007).
Id. (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13–21–119(1), (4)). See also Fielder, 49 P.3d at 350–51.
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additional duties for individuals involved in equine activities.152 This
is also the case for the Space Activities Statute. The ELA abrogated the
former duties of the equine professional under common law.153 This is
also likely the case for the Space Activities Statute.
The ELA and the Space Activities Statute differ in two respects.
First, the ELA creates substantive duties for equine operators while
the Space Activities Statute does not. The ELA places a two-pronged
duty on sponsors, holding that a sponsor may be liable when he fails
to make reasonable efforts to determine either a participant’s ability
to engage in the equine activity or a participant’s ability to manage
a particular horse.154 The Space Activities Statute merely requires the
spaceflight operator to obtain a signed warning statement. Second, the
ELA defines inherent risks. The Space Activities Statute does not define
inherent risks, although it purports to immunize spaceflight entities
from liability arising therefrom.
When Colorado courts determine whether an injury was caused
by an inherent risk of the activity, they do not limit that analysis to
the immediate cause of the injury. Rather, they engage in a broader
causal analysis, finding a non-inherent risk in the chain of causation,
and using it to exclude the injury from the statute, thereby depriving
the operator of immunity. An example follows.
In Fielder v. Academy Riding Stables, the plaintiff was one of eighteen
persons who rented horses from the defendant to ride on a guided tour
who fell because an eleven-year old girl’s screaming scared his horse.155
Before the ride, all the participants reviewed a form that included the
rules and regulations governing the guided tour.156 On the form, the
participants also indicated their level of experience with horses.157 In
the young girl’s case, her father completed the form and indicated that
she had no experience horseback riding.158 The defendant’s employees
properly matched the young girl to an appropriate horse.159 “Inherent
risks,” under the ELA include “[t]he unpredictability of the animal’s
reaction to . . . sounds,” and “[t]he potential of a participant to act in
a negligent manner that may contribute to injury to the participant
Id. (citing Chadwick v. Colt Ross Outfitters, Inc., 100 P.3d 465, 468 (Colo. 2004)).
Id. (citing Shandy v. Sombrero Ranches, Inc., 525 P.2d 487 (Colo. App. 1974) (discussing
common law duties of a wrangler when a rider is unable to control a horse)).
154
Id. at 1073.
155
Fielder, 49 P.3d at 350.
156
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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or others, such as failing to maintain control over the animal.”160
Arguably, these were the precise risks that caused the plaintiff’s
injury. The horse reacted to the girl’s sound, and the girl’s negligent
screaming contributed to the injury. However, the Colorado Court of
Appeals interpreted the ELA as a limit on the universe of inherent risks
for which an operator will be immune.161 As a result, it found that the
horse throwing the plaintiff was not an inherent risk because the horse
did so as a result of the girl’s screaming. In other words, the direct cause
of the injuries was the negligence of the wranglers in failing to remove
the child from the horse before it bolted.162
Inherent risks of spaceflight are not defined in the Space Activities
Statute. As it stands, the only risks that will be discussed with SFPs
will be the hazards of spaceflight activities, as required by the federal
informed consent process. There is no other guidance as to what risks
will be described to SFPs. But whatever they may be, Colorado courts
will be inclined to treat them as a limit on, rather than an example of,
inherent risks. The legislature did not address this when it enacted the
Space Activities Statute.
Overall, the legislature did not address Colorado courts’ narrow
interpretation of liability-limiting statutes. The Colorado legislature
could have made it clear that the statute is meant to be read broadly.
Or it could have provided a list of inherent risks, clearly announcing
that such a list was exemplary and not exhaustive. What is clear, based
on Colorado case law, is that the summary description of general
dangers—death and bodily harm—is not sufficient to limit spaceflight
entity liability. And even if courts somehow rule it is, it would only
result in a narrow immunity.
b. Skiing
Jurisprudence about Colorado’s SLA similarly strictly construes
the statute. According to scholars, “Colorado judges and the Colorado
state legislature have been sparring for three decades over the text
of the Colorado Ski Safety Act of 1979 [the SLA].”163 After passage of
the SLA, Colorado courts issued several pro-plaintiff decisions.164 In
reaction to this, the legislature and the ski industry pushed to “redraft
and strengthen the assumption of risk language in the statute” in
Fielder, 49 P.3d at 350–51 (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-119(2)(f)(II), (IV), (V) (2001)).
Id. at 351–52 (citing Graven v. Vail Assocs., Inc., 909 P.2d 514, 519 (Colo. 1995); Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 33-44-103(3.5) (2001)).
162
Id. at 351.
163
Feldman, supra note 1, at 286–92. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 33-44-101 to -114 (2006).
164
Feldman, supra note 1, at 286–92.
160
161
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1990.165 However, post-1990 decisions continue to betray a strong proplaintiff bent. The Space Activities Statute does not adequately address
this documented preference by Colorado courts. So, to the extent the
Colorado legislature was trying to strengthen the protections afforded
to spaceflight entities, it did not do so.
According to the Colorado Supreme Court, the SLA was enacted in
1979 “to establish reasonable safety standards and to define the relative
rights and responsibilities of ski area operators and skiers.”166 The SLA
contains a legislative declaration explaining the purpose of the statute,
which includes: 1) establishment of reasonable safety standards; 2)
further definition of the legal responsibilities of ski area operators and
their agents and employees; 3) the definition of the responsibilities of
skiers using such ski areas; and 4) the definition of rights and liabilities
existing between the skier and the ski area operator and between
skiers.167 Further, the SLA imposes several specific duties on ski area
operators, and explicitly states that any violation of those duties is
negligence.168 There is no such provision in the Space Activities Statute.
As stated above, in 1990 the Colorado legislature amended the SLA.
The 1990 amendments introduced a laundry list of “inherent dangers
and risks of skiing” which does not include the ski resort operator’s
negligence.169 Despite the laundry list of “inherent dangers” in the
SLA, Colorado courts, including the Colorado Supreme Court, have
repeatedly engaged in a subjective inquiry of what the court perceives
to be an inherent risk of skiing, rather than relying on the statutory list.
For example, in Graven v. Vail Associates, Inc., the plaintiff suffered
extensive injuries as a result of skiing off a ravine.170 In his complaint,
the plaintiff said he “moved toward the far left side of the ski run and
began stopping in order to wait for his companions.”171 As he “was
coming to a complete stop, he came upon some slushy snow and lost
his edges, fell down, slid several feet, then plunged forty-fifty feet
down an unmarked steep ravine or precipice . . . .”172 The plaintiff
alleged he was “unable to stop until colliding with a cluster of trees at
Id. (internal citation omitted).
Graven v. Vail Assocs., Inc., 909 P.2d 514, 517 (Colo. 1995).
167
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 33-44-102 (1995).
168
Graven, 909 P.2d at 517 (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 33-44-106 to -108 (1984); Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 33-44-104(2) (1984)).
169
Id. at 518 (citing Ch. 256, §§ 2, 3, 7, §§ 33-44-103(10), -107(2)(d), -112, 1990 Colo. Sess. Laws 1540,
1541, 1543).
170
Id. at 515.
171
Id.
172
Id.
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the bottom of the Steep Ravine.”173 He also alleged that the ravine was
“immediately next to” the ski-run and the defendant failed to warn of
a known dangerous condition.174
The Colorado Supreme Court decided whether the ravine and
the conditions that led to the plaintiff’s fall fit the description of an
“inherent risk” of skiing.175 The court noted that the list of inherent
risks was also a list of the conditions that are an “integral part of the
sport of skiing,” adding a qualifier to the concept of “inherent risk”
which was not otherwise in the statute. The Colorado Supreme Court
added this concept of “integral” sport as a limitation to the list of
inherent dangers.176 In other words, if a risk is inherent but not integral,
it is not an inherent risk for purposes of the SLA and the ski operator
loses immunity for injuries resulting therefrom. Although the word
“including” follows the words “integral part of the sport of skiing,”
indicating the list is not exhaustive, the court did not address that issue.
Rather than analyze the list of dangers or conditions in the SLA,
the court engaged in a subjective analysis of what it perceived to be
dangerous about the conditions encountered by the plaintiff. It first
recalled that the plaintiff described the terrain which led to his injuries
as “a steep ravine or precipice immediately next to the ski run.”177
The court then used its imagination to make a determination, “[t]
his description conjures up an image of a highly dangerous situation
created by locating a ski run at the very edge of a steep dropoff.”178
The court found that allowing ski operators to not warn against such
“highly dangerous situations” would render “the ski area operator’s
duty to warn under [the SLA] . . . essentially meaningless.”179 Therefore,
the court held that the SLA did not “include such a situation within
the inherent dangers and risks of skiing as a matter of law.”180 The
court reversed and remanded for the trial court to resolve the conflict
between the defendant’s and the plaintiff’s descriptions of the area.181
The Colorado Space Activities Statute does not contain a list of
“inherent risks” which may have indicated to the Colorado courts that
Graven, 909 P.2d at 515.
Id. at 515.
175
Id. at 518–19.
176
Id. at 519 (emphasis added) (citing Accord Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1044–
45 (Utah 1991) (distinguishing between risks on the basis of whether they are an integral part of
the sport of skiing)).
177
Id. at 520.
178
Graven, 909 P.2d at 520.
179
Id.
180
Id.
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they should not limit the universe of inherent risks. Nor does it contain
language instructing Colorado courts about the scope or meaning
of “inherent risks.” In light of the Graven decision, the Colorado
legislature’s failure to address inherent risks is a significant oversight.
If the Colorado legislature truly wants to increase spaceflight entities’
immunity, it has to address this issue.
Federal courts in Colorado interpreting the SLA have strayed
from the Colorado state courts’ lead in Graven. In Kumar v. Copper
Mountain, Inc. the plaintiff was skiing in an area where two “expert”
runs converge.182 At that intersection, snow naturally accumulates and
forms a feature called “Celebrity Cornice.”183 The plaintiff approached
Celebrity Cornice but did not see the edge of the drop-off.184 He skied off
the Celebrity Cornice, fell, and injured himself.185 The court recognized
that a ski operator can be liable under two theories. First, “a skier may
recover if his injury did not result from an inherent danger or risk of
skiing.”186 If a skier is injured by something other than an inherent risk,
the SLA does not apply, and the claim is governed by common-law.187
Second, a ski area operator may be liable because it violated the SLA
and the violation resulted in injury.188
The Colorado federal court held that the cornice was an inherent
danger under the statute because it was, at the very least, either “a
snow condition as they exist or change” or a “variation of steepness
or terrain,” both of which are listed as inherent risks.189 As a result, the
claim was governed by the SLA, which in turn abrogated the plaintiff’s
common law claims.190 The Colorado federal court also held that the
defendant’s failure to mark the cornice could have been a “but for”
cause of the accident. But because there could be several “but for”
causes, including the cornice itself, and because the SLA does not
restrict its application to claims resulting “solely” from the inherent
dangers of skiing, the ravine was one of several “but for” causes of the
plaintiff’s injuries, thereby barring his claim under the SLA. 191
The Colorado legislature may have attempted to preempt the
courts’ resistance with the Legislative Purpose statement in the Space
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
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Kumar v. Copper Mountain, Inc., 431 F. App’x 736, 737 (10th Cir. 2011).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 738.
Kumar, 431 F. App’x at 738.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Activities Statute. But the legislature already tried this and failed with
the SLA when it amended it in 1990. The SLA’s Legislative Purpose
states that the 1990 amendments were enacted to clarify the “confusion”
created by the 1979 SLA as to whether “the skier accepts and assumes
the dangers and risks inherent in the sport of skiing.”192 To clear up this
“confusion,” the Colorado legislature pronounced that, “as a matter
of public policy, no person engaged in that sport shall recover from
a ski area operator for injuries resulting from those inherent dangers
and risks.”193 Despite the clear directive by the legislature about the
purpose of the statute, Colorado courts continue to issue pro-plaintiff
decisions where the facts don’t seem to support them. It is therefore
unlikely that Colorado courts will pay more attention to the relatively
muted Space Activities Statute language to the effect that spaceflight
entities “should reasonably expect some degree of protection in the
event of an accident that might occur as a result of the inherent dangers
of spaceflight.”194
In light of the battle raging over the application of the SLA, it is
surprising that the legislature did not preempt Colorado courts’
potential resistance to the Space Activities Statute. The Space Activities
Statute—as detailed above—has a very limited definition of “inherent
risk.” The Colorado Supreme Court reads inherent risks very narrowly,
even when a laundry list of such inherent risks is included in the
statute. The Space Activities Statute’s failure to address this could be a
hindrance to limiting spaceflight entities’ liability.
3. Express Assumption of Risk
Under Colorado law, exculpatory agreements are generally
disfavored.195 However, courts will enforce them so long as one party is
not “at such obvious disadvantage in bargaining power that the effect
of the contract is to put him at the mercy of the other’s negligence.”196
If the parties had even bargaining power, Colorado courts proceed
to a multi-layer analysis of the exculpatory provision itself. Under
Colorado law the sufficiency and validity of an exculpatory agreement
are questions of law for courts to determine.197
The Colorado ELA requires posting and signature of a warning
Laws 1990, S.B. 90-80, §§ 1, 9, and 10.
Id.
194
S. 12-035, 2012 Leg., Ch. 126 § 1(2) (Colo. 2012).
195
B & B Livery, Inc. v. Riehl, 960 P.2d 134, 136 (Colo. 1998) (citing Heil Valley Ranch v. Simkin,
784 P.2d 781, 783 (Colo. 1989)).
196
B & B Livery, 960 P.2d at 136 (citing Heil Valley Ranch, 784 P.2d at 783; W. Keeton et al., Prosser
and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 68, at 482 (5th ed. 1984)).
197
B & B Livery, 960 P.2d at 136 (internal citation omitted).
192
193
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statement which reads as follows:
WARNING
Under Colorado Law, an [equine]
professional is not liable for an injury to
or the death of a participant in [equine]
activities resulting from the inherent risks
of [equine] activities, pursuant to section
13-21-119, Colorado Revised Statutes.198
Similarly, the Colorado SLA requires posting and signature of the
following warning statement:
WARNING
Under Colorado law, a skier assumes the
risk of any injury to person or property
resulting from any of the inherent
dangers and risks of skiing and may
not recover from any ski area operator
for any injury resulting from any of
the inherent dangers and risks of skiing,
including: Changing weather conditions;
existing and changing snow conditions;
bare spots; rocks; stumps; trees; collisions
with natural objects, man-made objects,
or other skiers; variations in terrain; and
the failure of skiers to ski within their
own abilities.199
The equivalent warning from the Colorado Space Activities Statute is:
Under Colorado law, there is no liability
for any loss, damage, injury to, or death of
a spaceflight participant in a spaceflight
activity provided by a spaceflight entity if
such loss, damage, injury, or death results
from the inherent risks of the spaceflight
activity to the spaceflight participant.
Injuries caused by the inherent risks of
spaceflight activities may include, among
others, death or injury to person or
198
199

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 33-21-119 (2013) (highlighting added).
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 33-44-107.

Vol. 6.1

Legislation & Policy Brief

73

property. I, the undersigned spaceflight
participant, assume the inherent risk of
participating in this spaceflight activity.
The SLA and the ELA differ in that the SLA elaborates by identifying
injuries caused by the inherent risks of spaceflight. The ELA does not—
probably because it defines inherent risks of equine activities elsewhere
in the statute.200 The Space Activities Statute does not describe inherent
risks anywhere.
The first sentence of the Space Activities Statute’s warning statement
closely resembles the ELA warning statement. Specifically, both warning
statements refer to lack of liability and succinctly refer to “inherent
risks.” Also, neither warning statement refers to the defendant’s
degree of culpability. In addition, both warning statements indicate
that the participant “assumes” the “inherent risks” of participating
in the activity. In other words, both the ELA and the Space Activities
Statute’s warning statements state that: 1) the participant assumes; 2)
the inherent risks of the activity; 3) which are not defined; and 4) for an
unspecified degree of the defendant’s culpability.
The similarity is especially important given the Colorado Supreme
Court’s holding in B&B Livery, Inc. v. Riehl that the ELA mandatory
warning does not immunize the equine operator for its own negligence
or from liability for non-inherent risks.201 Because of the textual
similarity, this Supreme Court holding about the ELA’s warning
statement’s scope is authoritative, impactful, and easily applied to the
Space Activities Statute.
Colorado courts analyze exculpatory provisions in three steps
consisting of: 1) a four-factor analysis; 2) a public policy analysis; and 3)
a legislative policy review. In addition, when interpreting exculpatory
provisions for inherent risks of an activity, Colorado courts are willing
to include operator negligence as an inherent risk, thereby exculpating
an operator for its own negligence even though the exculpatory
provision does not expressly say so.202
The first step of the analysis is the application of a four-factor test
adopted in Jones v. Dressel,203 which in turn incorporated the four factors
from the California Supreme Court decision Tunkl204 into Colorado law
200
201
202
203
204

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 33-21-119(2)(f).
B & B Livery, 960 P.2d at 137–38.
Chadwick v. Colt Ross Outfitters, Inc., 100 P.3d 465, 466 (Colo. 2004).
623 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1981).
Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963).
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(note that these factors are also adopted by New Mexico, as described
below). In Colorado the four factors are now called the Jones factors. The
Jones factors determine the enforceability of an exculpatory provision
based on: (1) the existence of a duty to the public; (2) the nature of
the service performed; (3) whether the contract was fairly entered into;
and (4) whether the intention of the parties is expressed in clear and
unambiguous language.205 Whether the parties’ intent is clear and
unambiguous is subject to a little more elaboration.
The first Jones factor hinges on whether the operator is engaged
in an activity of public necessity because such activities trigger a
duty to the public.206 In Hamill v. Cheley Colorado Camps, a Colorado
Court of Appeals recognized that a business engaged in a recreational
activity that is not practically necessary, such as equine activities, is not
performing services implicating a public duty.207 This is also the case
for spaceflight activities and makes the first of the Jones factor weigh in
favor of enforcing spaceflight exculpatory provisions.
The second Jones factor examines the nature of the service
performed.208 In Jones the defendant provided recreational camping
services, including horseback riding. The Court of Appeals looked
at whether such services are “a matter of practical necessity for even
some members of the public,” and determined they were not because
horseback riding is not “an essential service.”209 The Court of Appeals
also referred to the ELA, noting that because the ELA limits “civil liability
of those involved in equine activities,” such limitation “underscores the
fact that horseback riding is a matter of choice rather than necessity.”210
The same can be said of spaceflight activities. Therefore, the second
Jones factor would also weigh in favor of enforcing a release.
Under the third Jones factor “a contract is fairly entered into if one
party is not so obviously disadvantaged with respect to bargaining
power that the resulting contract essentially places him at the mercy
of the other party’s negligence.”211 The Court of Appeals in Hamill
B & B Livery, 960 P.2d at 136 (quoting favorably from Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 444–46); Chadwick, 100
P.3d at 465–66 (Colo. 2004).
206
Hamill v. Cheley Colorado Camps, 262 P.3d 948, 949 (Colo. App. 2011) (citing Chadwick, 100
P.3d at 469).
207
Hamill, 262 P.3d at 949 (citing Chadwick, 100 P.3d at 469).
208
Id. (citing B & B Livery, 960 P.2d at 136; Jones, 623 P.2d at 376).
209
Id. (citing Jones, 623 P.2d at 377–78; see also Chadwick, 100 P.3d at 467; Day v. Snowmass Stables,
Inc., 810 F. Supp. 289, 294 (D. Colo. 1993) (noting that recreational equine services offered by the
stable were not essential); Stanley v. Creighton Co., 911 P.2d 705 (Colo. 1996) (finding that the
residential lease was matter of public interest, and the exculpatory clause was void)).
210
Hamill, 262 P.3d at 949 (citing Chadwick, 100 P.3d at 467–68).
211
Id. (citing Heil Valley Ranch v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781, 784 (Colo. 1989); accord Mincin v. Vail
Holdings, Inc., 308 F.3d 1105, 1111 (10th Cir. 2002) (the second and third prongs of Jones inquire
205
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again relied on the non-essential nature of equine activities, “[b]ecause
horseback riding is not an essential activity, [the plaintiff’s] mother
was not ‘at the mercy’ of [the defendant’s] negligence when signing
the agreement.”212 Likewise, because spaceflight activities are not an
“essential activity,” nobody signing releases to participate is “at the
mercy” of the spaceflight entity’s negligence when it chooses to sign.
Also, it is unlikely that a person paying tens of thousands of dollars,
sometimes hundreds of thousands of dollars, for a recreational activity
is “at the mercy” of the provider. Therefore, the third Jones factor would
also, in theory, weigh in favor of enforcing a spaceflight activity release.
Under the fourth Jones factor, a release must be written in simple,
clear terms, and must not be “inordinately long or complicated.”213
Language whereby a release encompasses “any and all liability, claims,
demands, actions, or rights of action, which are related to or are in any
way connected with [plaintiffs’] participation in this activity” increases
likelihood of enforcement.214 For example, in Heil Valley Ranch v. Simkin,
the court held a release unambiguous because, among other things:
“(1) the agreement was written in simple and clear terms that were
free from legal jargon; (2) it was not inordinately long and complicated;
(3) the plaintiff indicated in her deposition that she understood the
release; (4) the first sentence of the release specifically addressed
a risk that described the circumstances of the plaintiff’s injury.”215
In the spaceflight context, the extensive federal informed consent
requirements should dispose of any concerns the party signing the
release does not understand the undertaken activity. In both Chadwick
v. Colt Ross Outfitters, Inc. and B&B Livery, the agreement was three
and a half pages and therefore not “inordinately long.”216 Also, the
legal jargon was minimal,217 and the agreement identified many risks
associated with camping activities, including horseback riding.218
In B&B Livery the court only focused on the fourth Jones factor, whether
the intention of the parties was expressed in clear and unambiguous
into the respective bargaining power of each party created by the “practical necessity” of the
activity)).
212
Hamill, 262 P.3d at 949 (citing Chadwick, 100 P.3d at 469; see also Mincin, 308 F.3d at 1111 (because
mountain biking was not an essential activity, no inferior bargaining power was identified); Day,
810 F. Supp. at 294 (defendants did not enjoy an unfair bargaining advantage in offering equine
services)).
213
Cf. Brooks v. Timberline Tours, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 959, 962 (D. Colo. 1996); Potter v. Nat’l
Handicapped Sports, 849 F. Supp. 1407, 1410–11 (D.Colo.1994).
214
Cf. Brooks, 941 F. Supp. at 962.
215
B & B Livery, Inc. v. Riehl, 960 P.2d 134, 138 (Colo. 1998) (citing Heil Valley Ranch, 784 P.2d at
785).
216
Hamill, 262 P.3d at 951.
217
Id.
218
Id.
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language.219 The Colorado court found the release was “written in
simple and clear terms,” “not inordinately long and complicated,” and
that the plaintiff indicated in her deposition that she understood she
was granting the defendant a release.220 The Colorado Supreme Court
also addressed whether inclusion of broader language limiting liability
for non-inherent risks made the entire exculpatory clause ambiguous.221
The court held that inclusion of the additional language did not
render the clause ambiguous.222 According to it, the broader clause
merely evinced the parties’ intent to extinguish all liability, including
liability above and beyond that provided in the ELA.223 Here, the court
found the intent “was clearly and unambiguously expressed not by
the standard [ELA] warning” but as a consequence of the additional
clause limiting liability “in the event of any injury or damage of any
nature (or perhaps even death).”224 Although the legislature could have
drafted better language, the Space Activities Statute and its mandatory
language are not problematic under common law because the parties
are free to supplement it without running the risk of having the entire
clause declared ambiguous as a matter of law.
The agreement in Hamill, like that in Chadwick, also broadly stated
the intent to release liability from “any injury,” and like the one in
B&B Livery, Inc. it included all degrees of potential injury, including
the “death” of the participant.225 This latter language is in the Space
Activities Statute warning language.226 Further, the Hamill release
covered “inherent and other risks,” noting that “[m]any, but not all, of
these risks are inherent,” and stating that it was impossible to delineate
a full list of risks, inherent or otherwise.227 In the case of spaceflight
activities, the scope and extent of “inherent and other risks” will, in all
likelihood, be covered in the informed consent statement required by
federal law, and if not included, can be added for completeness.228
In Chadwick the plaintiff was injured during a back-country trip
when he was thrown off a mule.229 The plaintiff had signed a release
that contained the following language: “RELEASE FROM ANY
LEGAL LIABILITY . . . for any injury or death caused by or resulting
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
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228
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B & B Livery, 960 P.2d at 136.
Id. at 138 (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
B & B Livery, 960 P.2d at 138.
Hamill, 262 P.3d at 951.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Chadwick v. Colt Ross Outfitters, Inc., 100 P.3d 465, 465–66 (Colo. 2004).
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from [his] participation in the activities.”230 The Colorado Supreme
Court ultimately upheld the release as barring claims for negligence,
even though it did not contain the word “negligence,”231 because it
was “not inordinately long,” “uncomplicated[,] and was free from
legal jargon.”232 Further, the Colorado Supreme Court looked at the
organization of the contract, including where the release was placed
within the document.233 It held the placement made it “unrealistic” that
the plaintiff had “missed or misunderstood” the release.234
In Hamill the exculpatory provision contained language to the
effect that “[e]quipment used . . . may break, fail or malfunction” and
that “counselors . . . may misjudge . . . circumstances.”235 An informed
consent conversation under federal law would probably include such
information about spaceflight activities. Notably, discussions of failures
would include explanations of how near misses and catastrophic losses
take place, and that human error has caused space-related loss, injury,
and death. The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that the breadth
of the release demonstrated that the parties intended to disclaim legal
liability for negligence claims,236 and that such negligence included the
operator’s misjudgment of a situation, “[i]ndeed, misjudging a situation
can amount to negligence.”237 This language is particularly helpful for
spaceflight entities because it allows them to argue for application of
releases to human error.
The second step of the analysis is a public policy review of the
exculpatory provision. Colorado courts will declare an exculpatory
provision void if it is against public policy. As a general rule, under
Colorado law, exculpatory provisions involving certain businesses are
automatically void as against public policy.238 These certain businesses
are generally those suitable for public regulation, engaged in performing
a public service of great importance, or even of practical necessity,
offering a service that is generally available to any member of the
public who seeks it and possessing a decisive advantage of bargaining
strength, enabling them to confront the public with a standardized
adhesion contract of exculpation.239 However, the Colorado Supreme
Id. at 466.
Id.
232
Id. at 468.
233
Id.
234
Chadwick, 100 P.3d at 468.
235
Hamill, 262 P.3d at 951.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Chadwick, 100 P.3d at 467 (citing Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 376 (Colo. 1981); Tunkl v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 444–46 (Cal. 1963)).
239
Id. (citing Jones, 623 P.2d at 376; Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 444–46).
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Court excludes businesses engaged in recreational activities, such as
equine operators, from this bar on exculpatory provisions because
equine activities are not practically necessary and the provider owes
no special duty to the public.240 There is a strong argument that the
same can be said of spaceflight activities as currently contemplated,
which tend to be recreational or research based. As a result, precedent
currently weighs in favor of enforcing exculpatory provisions for
spaceflight activities. It also indicates that the public policy analysis
should always weigh in favor of enforcing exculpatory provisions
between SFPs and spaceflight entities.
The third step of the analysis is a legislative policy review. Colorado
courts look to any related statutes limiting liability to determine
whether the statutes should have an effect on their interpretation of
exculpatory provisions. In cases involving equine activities, Colorado
courts look at the ELA to confirm whether their decisions are consistent
with the statutory framework created by the legislature. And whereas
the New Mexico courts interpret immunizing statutes as limiting
what operators can be exculpated from by agreement, the Colorado
courts take the opposite view, declaring the statutes a floor—and not a
ceiling—to operator exculpation.
What the Colorado Supreme Court was trying to do was determine
whether allowing parties to increase the defendant’s immunity for
horseback riding activities was consistent with the legislative policy
encapsulated in the ELA. The Colorado Supreme Court’s starting point
to determine legislative intent was the ELA’s statement of purpose,
which expressly included decreasing liability of equine activity
operators. 241 The Colorado court focused on the fact that one of the
stated purposes of the act was to limit equine operator’s exposure.
In addition, the court turned to the express scope of and limits on an
equine activity operator’s immunity as listed in Section 13-21-119 of
the ELA. As a result, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the statute
was a floor, not a ceiling, to immunity,242 and operators were free to
add language increasing immunity.243 This holding strengthens the
effectiveness of the Space Activities Statute by creating a minimum
liability exposure for spaceflight entities, but leaving intact spaceflight
entities’ and SFPs’ freedom to further decrease that exposure.
Further giving spaceflight entities freedom to limit their exposure,
Id. (citing Jones, 623 P.2d at 377; Barker v. Colo. Region–Sports Car Club of Am., Inc., 532 P.2d
372, 377 (Colo. App. 1974)).
241
B & B Livery, Inc. v. Riehl, 960 P.2d 134, 136–37 (Colo. 1998) (emphasis in original).
242
B & B Livery, 960 P.2d at 137; Chadwick, 100 P.3d at 469.
243
B & B Livery, 960 P.2d at 137; Chadwick, 100 P.3d at 469.
240
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Colorado courts encourage parties to draft broad exculpatory
provisions because they are unlikely to invalidate them even if
overbroad. If a release is “too broad on its face”—if, for example, it
exculpates an operator for willful and wanton negligence—Colorado
courts will nonetheless uphold the release to the extent allowable by
law and ignore its overly broad elements.244
To summarize, under Colorado law a release is reviewed in three
steps: 1) the Jones factors; 2) a public policy analysis; and 3) a legislative
policy review. The Colorado courts’ interpretation of exculpatory
provisions gives operators robust protections, which based on the
analysis above, are also available to spaceflight entities. Of the four Jones
factors, the one most under a spaceflight entities’ control is the drafting
of an unambiguous warning statement. In order to do so a spaceflight
entity has to make sure the agreement is: 1) written in simple and clear
terms; 2) free from legal jargon; 3) short (three and a half pages or
less); 4) indicates the plaintiff understands the release; 5) specifically
addresses risks, which increases the likelihood that the plaintiff’s
injury will be described in the release; 6) includes the statutory release
for inherent risks, and 7) includes language releasing the defendant
from any legal liability, possibly adding the word “negligence” which,
although not required, would help. This is not covered by the Colorado
Space Activities Statute and is entirely a creature of Colorado common
law. As a result, under Colorado law, spaceflight entities would have
been entirely able to protect themselves without legislative intervention
by drafting adequate exculpatory provisions.
4. Implied Assumption of Risk
Colorado is unique with respect to assumption of risk because it is
the only state that codified the defense. In fact, Colorado codified its
entire negligence regime, which is a hybrid contributory-comparative
negligence system. Contributory negligence survives in part because
a plaintiff is barred from recovery if her negligence is greater than
the defendant’s.245 But if her negligence is equal to or lesser than
the defendant’s, any recovery will be reduced by that negligence.246
Colorado also codified the defense of assumption of risk for persons
who voluntarily or unreasonably choose to expose themselves to
an injury or danger with knowledge or appreciation of the danger
involved:

244
245
246

Chadwick, 100 P.3d at 468–69 (internal citations omitted).
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-111 (2013).
Id.

80

Is Statutory Immunity for Spaceflight Operators
Good Enough?
For the purposes of this section, a person
assumes the risk of injury or damage if
he voluntarily or unreasonably exposes
himself to injury or damage with
knowledge or appreciation of the danger
and risk involved. In any trial to a jury in
which the defense of assumption of risk
is an issue for determination by the jury,
the court shall instruct the jury on the
elements as described in this section.247

The language above does not speak in terms of the defendant’s duty
but rather focuses on the plaintiff’s assumption of a known risk, i.e.
waiver. It is therefore a codification of SAR, because PAR hinges on
a defendant’s lack of duty, regardless of the plaintiff’s knowledge,
while SAR is based on a plaintiff’s voluntary encountering of a known
danger caused by a defendant’s breach. As a result, there is no PAR
defense under Colorado law. To the extent the Space Activities Statute
codifies a PAR-light defense (providing something more than SAR, but
not quite PAR) the Space Activities Statute is an improvement on the
common law.
SAR under Colorado law encompasses “either a plaintiff’s
unreasonable exposure to a known risk or a plaintiff’s voluntary but not
necessarily unreasonable exposure to such risk.”248 It is more difficult
to raise SAR as a defense in Colorado than it is in other states because
it requires the plaintiff to have actual knowledge and appreciation
of the precise risk encountered.249 Not only that, assumption of risk
requires both knowledge of the danger and consent to it.250 It does not
merely require that the plaintiff be aware of the existence of a danger.
Colorado law therefore incorporates both strict and qualified SAR. And
this definition is difficult to satisfy. The few court decisions discussing
SAR support this narrow interpretation of the defense. An SFP would
have to know of the particular risk that injured her. In other words,
the risk cannot develop after the SFP engages in the activity nor can it
develop unbeknownst to the SFP, because under those circumstances
it is unknown. In the context of spaceflight such a narrow definition
makes it difficult for a spaceflight operator to ever obtain the benefit
of SAR. The SFP must have known of the particular risk that caused
Colo. Rev. Stat.§ 13-21-111.7 (2013).
See generally Harris v. The Ark, 810 P.2d 226, 229 (Colo. 1991) (defining assumption of risk).
249
Wark v. McClellan, 68 P.3d 574, 581 (Colo. App. 2003).
250
Carter v. Lovelace, 844 P.2d 1288, 1289 (Colo. App. 1992) (citing Summit Cnty. Dev. Corp. v.
Bagnoli, 441 P.2d 658 (Colo. 1968)).
247
248
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the injury and decided to face it anyway. As an example, it seems that
an SFP would have to know not merely of the risk that a seal would
break on a space vehicle. But that it was actually faulty, and decided
to fly anyway. This seems like an extreme application of SAR, leaving
little room for its use as a defense. But the current statute would at least
support such a reading. It is also difficult to gauge how accurate this
reading of the statute is because case law applying it is scarce. And
even in the available case law, the facts are distinguishable from those
relevant to a dispute between an SFP and a spaceflight entity.251
The legislature’s decision to pass the Space Activities Statute did, in
fact, improve spaceflight entities’ status compared to what it would be
under common law. The Colorado common law regarding assumption
of risk can only be used in very specific sets of circumstances and
does not include PAR. By codifying something more akin to PAR, the
Colorado legislature did in fact move towards its goal of increasing
protection for the spaceflight entities as compared to common law.
C. Florida
1. Space Activities Statute
Florida defines a “spaceflight entity” as the FAA license holder,
and all manufacturers and suppliers reviewed by the FAA during the
licensing process.252 The Florida Space Activities Statute wholesale
adopts the definitions of SFP and spaceflight activities as those terms
are defined in the Launch Act.253
As expected, Florida requires a spaceflight entity to obtain the
statutorily mandated warning statement signed by the SFP.254 But the
Florida Space Activities Statute does not require compliance with the
federal informed consent process.255 Once a spaceflight entity complies
with the Space Activities Statute, the spaceflight entity will not be
liable for injury to or death of an SFP resulting from the “inherent risks
of spaceflight activities.”256 Florida therefore uses the inherent risk
concept, but it does not define it and it does not tie into the federal
See generally Harris v. The Ark, 810 P.2d 226 (Colo. 1991) (upholding the constitutionality of
the assumption of risk statute but applying it to a slip and fall case); Wagner Rents, Inc. v. Griffith
Maint., Inc., No. 2004CV8553 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 8, 2005) (applying assumption of risk as an
exception to a waiver damage clause for a damaged draining pump).
252
Fla. Stat. § 331.501(1)(c) (2013).
253
Fla. Stat. § 331.501(1)(a), (c). Some of the statutes refer to 49 U.S.C. § 70102, which was
recodified in 2010 to 51 U.S.C. § 50902, without textual changes.
254
Fla. Stat. § 331.501(2)(a).
255
Fla. Stat. § 331.501(2)(a).
256
Fla. Stat. § 331.501(2)(a).
251
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informed consent process where SFPs are informed of the hazards of
spaceflight activities.
The Florida Space Activities Statute provides no immunity if a
spaceflight entity commits an act or omission that constitutes either
gross negligence or willful or wanton disregard for an SFP’s safety.257
Florida also does not provide immunity if the space flight entity knows
or has reason to know of the dangerous condition that proximately
causes the injury.258 The term “known or should have known” is usually
associated with negligence in Florida jurisprudence. For example,
negligent entrustment requires a showing that the defendant knew
or should have known that entrusting property or chattel to a thirdparty would injure them.259 Likewise, in the business invitee context,
the same term also refers to mere negligence.260 Therefore, the Space
Activities Statute likely does not immunize a spaceflight operator for its
own negligence. Lastly, Florida does not immunize spaceflight entities
for intentional acts.261 Therefore, the Florida Space Activities Statute
codifies a light version of PAR because, although it bars recovery for
inherent risks, it excludes negligence from the scope of “inherent risk.”
2. Statutes Limiting Liability
When Florida courts rely on statutes in derogation of the common
law, it is a “well-established rule” that such statutes must be strictly
construed and if any doubt exists as to the legislature’s intent, the doubt
should be interpreted in favor of the injured party.262 The question here
is whether the Florida legislature removed any such “doubts.” For
example, it could have included an express statement about legislative
intent—which it did not do. Or guidance about construing “doubts.”
The Florida legislature could have also clarified the position the
Space Activities Statute has in the common law regime, rather than
generically stating that the statute did not otherwise affect remedies at
common law. These are measures the legislature either failed to take or
chose not to take. But in either case, the omission may undermine the
effectiveness of the Space Activities Statute’s purported goal.
The Florida ELA contains a list of “inherent risks” of equine
activities, which includes: (1) The propensity of equines to behave in
Fla. Stat. § 331.501(2)(b)(1).
Fla. Stat. § 331.501(2)(b)(2).
259
Cantalupo v. Lewis, 47 So. 3d 896, 899 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 390 (1965)).
260
Delgado v. Laundromax, Inc., 65 So. 3d 1087, 1089 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
261
Fla. Stat. § 331.501(2)(3).
262
McGraw v. R&R Invs., Ltd., 877 So. 2d 886, 890 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (citing State ex. rel.
Grady v. Coleman, 183 So. 25 (Fla. 1938)).
257
258
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ways that may result in injury, harm, or death to persons on or around
them; (2) the unpredictability of an equine’s reaction to such things as
sounds, sudden movement, and unfamiliar objects, persons or other
animals; and (3) the potential of a participant to act in a negligent
manner that may contribute to injury to the participant or others, such
as failing to maintain control over the animal or not acting within his
or her ability.263 The statute does not apply if the operator fails to make
reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the participant’s ability to
safely engage in the equine activity, or to determine the participant’s
ability to safely manage the particular equine based on the participant’s
representation of ability. And there is no limited liability for equine
activities when the claim is based on, “an act or omission that a
reasonably prudent person would not have done or omitted under the
same or similar circumstances.”264
This language, although not identical, appears to echo a similar
provision in Florida’s Space Activities Statute excluding a spaceflight
entity from coverage if the spaceflight entity, “Has actual knowledge
or reasonably should have known of a dangerous condition on the
land or in the facilities or equipment used in the spaceflight activities
and the danger proximately causes injury, damage, or death to the
participant . . . .”265 Courts have applied the ELA limitation quite
strictly. It is therefore possible they would do the same for the Space
Activities Statute language.
Florida legislators attempting to attract spaceflight entities to
Florida by enacting the Florida Space Activities Statute may not have
been aware of the Florida courts’ tendency to avoid relying on statutes
to resolve disputes between operators and participants. Indeed, the
three cases interpreting the Florida ELA evidence the courts’ preference
to either find exclusion from immunity (in two of the three cases) or
rely on a contractual exculpation (in the third case) to limit an equine
operator’s liability.266
In Raveson v. Walt Disney World Co., the plaintiff was injured during
an organized ride in Disney’s “Enchanted Forest.”267 The defendant
claimed both statutory immunity and exculpatory agreement. Rather
than beginning its analysis with the statute, the Court of Appeals

Fla. Stat. § 773.01(6) (2013).
Fla. Stat. § 773.03(2)(d).
265
Fla. Stat. § 331.501(2)(b)(2).
266
Raveson v. Walt Disney World Co., 793 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); McGraw v. R&R
Invs., Ltd., 877 So. 2d 886 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
267
Raveson, 793 So. 2d at 1171.
263
264
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analyzed, and reached a holding on the exculpatory agreement alone.268
It then, in dicta, noted that the statute could also serve to release the
defendant from liability, but declined to rely on it for its holding.269
Similarly, in 2010 another Florida Court of Appeals called to interpret
the ELA avoided the ELA altogether by reading into the statute two
implicit exclusions from coverage for the operator.270
The decision was McGraw v. R and R Investments, Ltd.,271 where
a horse trainer was thrown by a horse belonging to her employer.272
The defendant prevailed at the trial level based on ELA statutory
immunity.273 Under the ELA, although the operators are under a duty
to post certain warnings, there are no provisions creating consequences
for a sponsor’s failure to do so.274 However, on appeal the plaintiff
argued that the defendant’s failure to post the statutorily required
warnings deprived it of protection under the statute.275 Although the
statute does not expressly say so, the Court of Appeals agreed with
the plaintiff.276 The court noted that, although as a general rule courts
do not ordinarily imply exceptions to the provisions of a statute, such
exceptions may be supplied where they are necessary to give effect
to the legislative intent.277 Finding such a need in this case, the court
proceeded to read into the statute a loss of immunity for failure to
comply with warning requirements.278 Legislators seeking to limit
liability for spaceflight entities addressed this issue head on: the Florida
Space Activities statute expressly conditions itself on the operator
providing an SFP with the statutorily mandated signed waiver. But
the point is not whether the failure to warn does or does not deprive
an operator of limited liability. The issue is the court’s willingness to
read into a statute a limitation that, on its face, is not there. And—if
that is the case—whether legislators took that into consideration when
they drafted the Space Activities Statute. Nothing in the Florida Space
Activities Statute provides language to guide (or more forcefully direct
the courts) to immunize spaceflight operators from liability.
The Court of Appeals then gave another extra-textual ground for its
holding. Under the ELA an operator loses immunity if it commits an
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278

Id. at 1172–73.
Id. at 1173.
McGraw, 877 So. 2d 886.
Id.
Id. at 888.
Id.
Id.
Id.
McGraw, 877 So. 2d at 888.
Id. at 890 (citing 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 213 (2001)).
Id.
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act “that a reasonably prudent person would not have done or omitted
under the same or similar circumstances.”279 The court held that the
defendant’s omission of not posting the warning signs was such an
unreasonable omission, which alternatively could also deprive it of
immunity under the ELA.280 The legislature, if aware of this language,
could have included verbiage in the Space Activities Statute to the
effect that a violation of the statute by an operator was not per se an
act “that a reasonably prudent person would not have done or omitted
under the same or similar circumstances.” What a plaintiff could
argue, otherwise, is that not only does a spaceflight entities’ failure
to provide the written warning under the Space Activities Statute
deprive that entity of protection under the statute (which is a perfectly
correct interpretation of the statute), but such actions are unreasonable,
possibly buttressing a claim for negligent conduct by the operator. The
legislature did not remove this judicially created weapon from SFPs’
arsenal and in doing so may have undermined the effectiveness of its
own efforts.
In the third case, McNichol v. South Florida Trotting Center, Inc., a race
track owner created, and left, a two-foot mound of dirt that blocked
access from the track to a grass infield.281 The mound blocked exit by a
horse that was out of control, making it impossible for the rider to regain
control, leading to his fall and injury. During discovery the general
manager testified that it was not reasonably prudent to maintain the
mound on the inside of the track for any extended period of time.282
In this case, the defendant’s owner and general manager testified that
the mound was a hazard, that it created a dangerous condition, and
that it was not good custom and practice to leave the mound in place
for any extended period of time.283 Given the defendants’ admission
of unreasonableness, the Florida Court of Appeals relied on the text of
the ELA and found immunity because the claim was based on, “an act
or omission that a reasonably prudent person would not have done or
omitted under the same or similar circumstances.”284
The case law is admittedly sparse. But the Florida Space Activities
statute does not seem to address judicial unwillingness to limit an
operator’s liability. Indeed, the Space Activities Statute deprives a
spaceflight entity of immunity for any degree of culpability, including
negligence. These observations are not to say that Florida courts would
279
280
281
282
283
284

Id. (citing Fla. Stat. § 773.03(2)(d) (2002)).
Id.
McNichol v. S. Fla. Trotting Ctr., Inc., 44 So. 3d 253, 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Fla. Stat. § 773.03(2)(d)).
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always rule against spaceflight entities. Indeed, they could choose to
interpret the Florida Space Activities Statute broadly. But given the case
law available, it seems preferable for spaceflight entities to immunize
themselves via exculpatory agreements, rather than merely rely on
the Space Activities Statute. If that is the case, the legislature did not
achieve its apparent goal of limiting liability for spaceflight entities in
Florida.
3. Express Assumption of Risk
Under Florida law, courts view contractual provisions exculpating
a party for its own negligence as “not favored in the law.”285 They will,
however, uphold them as “not violative of public policy” where the
two parties to the contract are, “of equal bargaining power and the
provisions are clear and unambiguous.”286 Florida courts, despite their
distaste for exculpatory provisions, have enforced such agreements
immunizing parties even for their own gross negligence.287 The only
instance where a Florida court violated an exculpatory clause on public
policy grounds was when it exempted a party for his own intentional
torts.288 Under Florida law, exculpatory provisions only release a party
from his own negligence when “the intention to be relieved from
liability was made clear and unequivocal in the contract; wording must
be so clear and understandable than an ordinary and knowledgeable
party will know what he is contracting away.”289
Under its ELA, Florida requires equine operators to obtain a signed
copy of, and post, the following language:
WARNING
Under Florida law, an equine activity
sponsor or equine professional is not
liable for an injury to, or the death
of, a participant in equine activities
resulting from the inherent risks of equine
activities.290
Hardage Enters., Inc. v. Fidesys Corp., 570 So. 2d 436, 439 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
Id. at 439 (citing Mankap Enters., Inc. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., Inc., 427 So. 2d 332 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983); Ivey Plants, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 282 So. 2d 205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied,
289 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1974)).
287
Id. at 439 (citing Continental Video Corp. v. Honeywell, Inc., 422 So. 2d 35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982), rev. denied, 456 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1982); Ace Formal Wear, Inc. v. Baker Protective Serv., Inc.,
416 So. 2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)).
288
Id.
289
Raveson, 793 So. 2d at 1173 (internal citations omitted).
290
Fla. Stat. § 773.04.
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The Florida Space Activities Statute mandates the following warning
statement:
WARNING: Under Florida law, there
is no liability for an injury to or death
of a participant in a spaceflight activity
provided by a spaceflight entity if such
injury or death results from the inherent
risks of the spaceflight activity. Injuries
caused by the inherent risks of spaceflight
activities may include, among others,
injury to land, equipment, persons, and
animals, as well as the potential for you
to act in a negligent manner that may
contribute to your injury or death. You
are assuming the risk of participating in
this spaceflight activity.291
To summarize, the Florida Space Activities Statute warning statement
refers to “inherent risks.” The statute, however, does not define
“inherent risks.” The warning statement does describe the injuries
resulting from the inherent risks of spaceflight, in a non-exhaustive
list. The warning statement, however, does not refer to the spaceflight
entities’ negligence, or any other degree of culpability. And the warning
statement speaks of “assumption” of risk rather than waiver.
Unfortunately, finding similarities is currently academic because
there is no case law interpreting the ELA warning. Therefore, this section
focuses on how Florida courts have interpreted other exculpatory
language limiting defendants’ liability. In Raveson a young girl was
injured while horseback riding on Disney property. Prior to her riding,
her parents signed the following statement:
RELEASE AND INDEMNITY
AGREEMENT
In consideration of the acceptance of my
participation and/or the participation
of my child or ward, in the renting of
a horse from the Walt Disney World
Company, and with the understanding
that a horse may be startled by sudden
movement, noise or other factors, and
291

Fla. Stat. § 331.501(3)(b).
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may shy suddenly, rear, stop short,
bite, buck, kick or run with its rider,
especially when the ride is conducted
through a natural setting, as this ride will
be, I AGREE TO ASSUME THE RISKS
incidental to such participation including,
but not limited to, those risks set out
above, and, on my own behalf, on behalf
of my child or ward, and on behalf of
my child’s or ward’s heirs, executors
and administrators, RELEASE and
forever discharge the released parties
defined below, of and from all liabilities,
claims, actions, damages, costs or expenses
of any nature, arising out of or in any way
connected with my participation and/or the
participation of my child or ward in such
horseback riding and further agree to
indemnify and hold each of the released
parties harmless against any and all such
liabilities, claims, actions, damages, costs
or expenses, including, but not limited
to, attorney’s fees and disbursements.
The released parties are the Walt Disney
World Company and Lake Buena Vista
Communities, Inc., their parent, related,
affiliated and subsidiary companies, and
the officers, directors, employees, agents,
representatives, successors and assigns
of each. I understand that this release and
indemnity agreement includes any claims
based on the negligence, actions or inaction
of any of the above released parties and covers
bodily injury and property damage, whether
suffered by me, my child or ward before,
during, or after such participation. I
further authorize medical treatment for
said child or ward, at my cost, if the need
arises.292

This language led to summary judgment for the defendant because it
Raveson v. Walt Disney World Co., 793 So. 2d 1171, 1172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (italics and
bold formatting added).
292

Vol. 6.1

Legislation & Policy Brief

89

“clearly [met] th[e] requirement” that:
the intention to be relieved from liability
was made clear and unequivocal in the
contract; wording must be so clear and
understandable than an ordinary and
knowledgeable party will know what he
is contracting away.293
The Florida Court of Appeals provided no additional analysis of the
language.
In Cousins Club Cop. v. Silva a 19-year old college student died as
a result of his participation in an amateur boxing fight.294 The college
student hurt his head during the fight but only received medical
assistance forty-five minutes after leaving the ring.295 According to
the plaintiffs’ expert medical testimony, the lack of medical attention
allowed the hematoma caused by the initial impacts to get much larger
and caused extremely high pressure to build up within the student’s
cranial cavity.296 Before the fight, the student signed a “Release,
Assumption of risk and Indemnification Agreement,”297 which stated,
In consideration of my participation in
the above entitled event, and with the
understanding that my participation
in Monday Night Boxing is only on the
condition that I enter into this agreement
for myself, my heirs and assigns, I hereby
assume the inherent and extraordinary
risks involved in Monday Night Boxing
and any risks inherent in any other activities
connected with this event in which I may
voluntarily participate.298
The Court of Appeals held that the release did not bar the plaintiffs’
lawsuit, because the student only assumed the risks inherent in the
boxing match, and therefore, only released liability for injuries resulting
from his voluntary participation in the boxing match.299 The injuries
Id. at 1173 (internal citations omitted).
Cousins Club Corp. v. Silva, 869 So. 2d 719, 720 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
295
Id.
296
Id.
297
Id.
298
Id. (italics and bold formatting added).
299
Cousins Club Corp., 869 So. 2d at 721 (citing Van Tuyn v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 447 So. 2d 318
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); O’Connell v. Walt Disney World Co., 413 So. 2d 444, 447 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
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he sustained—the lack of medical attention—were not inherent in the
boxing match.300 Further, the Court of Appeals held that the release did
not “clearly and unequivocally release” the defendant “from liability
for injuries to the plaintiff as a result of its own negligence.”301 As a
result, while the plaintiff may have been precluded from recovering
for injuries resulting from any dangers inherent in boxing, he was not
barred from recovering for injuries resulting from the defendant’s
negligence in failing to provide medical assistance.302
The release in Raveson was more extensive than the one in the Space
Activities Statute. For example, it contained language releasing the
defendant of, “all liabilities, claims, actions, damages, costs or expenses
of any nature.”303 It also expressly applied to injuries, “arising out of or
in any way connected with my participation and/or the participation
of my child or ward in such horseback riding . . . .”304 This language,
or similar language, does not appear in the Space Activities Statute.
And the legislature may want to include it to strengthen the warning
statement as a standalone exculpatory provision if it is trying to make
itself the most attractive state for spaceflight entities.
In Cousins Club Corp., the language was actually very similar to the
language in the Space Activities Statute warning statement. It was an
“assumption” of “inherent risks.” This language in Cousins Club Corp.
did not stop the Florida Court from inquiring whether the injury was
a result of an “inherent risk.” This means that a court interpreting the
Space Activities Statute will likely do the same. As a result, the warning
statement in the Space Activities Statute is not useful outside the context
of the Space Activities Statute and cannot be relied on as a standalone
exculpatory provision.
4. Implied Assumption of Risk
Neither SAR nor PAR exists under Florida law.305 The only type of
assumption of risk that exists is EAR.306 EAR, under Florida law, comes
in two types. One is contractual and analyzed above. The second is more
accurately labeled “participatory EAR” and is where “actual consent
exists [because] one voluntarily participates in a contact sport.”307
App. 1982)).
300
Id.
301
Id.
302
Id.
303
Raveson v. Walt Disney World Co., 793 So. 2d 1171, 1172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
304
Id.
305
Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 291–93 (Fla. 1977).
306
Id. at 290.
307
Id.
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Theoretically, participatory EAR bars recovery when the injured party
consented to a known risk.308
Participatory EAR only applies to a participant’s assumption of
the inherent risks of a sport, usually defined as a “contact sport.”309
Spaceflight activities hardly qualify as a “contact” sport, given that
Florida courts do not even consider horseback riding a “contact” sport
for this purpose.310 In addition, Florida courts will not apply participatory
EAR to a plaintiff’s aberrant conduct.311 Lastly, participatory EAR
requires the plaintiff to have been subjectively aware of the particular
risk that caused the injury and have assumed that particular risk.312
And juries, not judges, decide whether a risk is inherent in a sport,
precluding pre-trial dismissal.313 In other words, participatory EAR
only applies when the plaintiff, participating in a sport, acts reasonably,
was subjectively aware of the danger, and determination of application
of the defense is a fact issue. Therefore, under Florida common law,
spaceflight entities cannot expect to rely on PAR, SAR, or participatory
EAR. But assuming participatory EAR is extended to spaceflight
entities it would still provide meager comfort.
Florida participatory EAR is not like PAR because it is based on
waiver, not on absence of duty by the defendant.314 In other words, “[e]
xpress assumption of risk, as it applies in the context of contact sports,
rests upon the plaintiff’s voluntary consent to take certain chances.”315
In Florida, this would mean a spaceflight entity has to show that
the plaintiff had “subjective knowledge” of the risk and willingly
encountered it. Of all of the requirements, the “subjective knowledge”
requirement is the hardest to meet. And, for all practical purposes,
forecloses use of the defense.
In Mazzeo, a plaintiff dove into a few feet of water and injured
herself. The Florida Court of Appeals refused to bar the suit based on
participatory EAR because the plaintiff did not dive “with the intention
McNichol v. S. Fla. Trotting Ctr., Inc., 44 So. 3d 253, 257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (citing
Kuehner v. Green, 436 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1983)).
309
Ashcroft v. Calder Race Course, 492 So. 2d 1309, 1311 (Fla. 1986); Zalkin v. Am. Learning Syss.,
Inc., 639 So. 2d 1020, 1020 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Nova Univ. Inc. v. Katz, 636 So. 2d 729, 730
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Ashcroft v. Calder Race Course, 492 So. 2d 1309, 1309 (Fla. 1986)).
310
McNichol, 44 So. 3d at 257 (citing Ashcroft v. Calder Race Course, 492 So. 2d 1309, 1311 (Fla.
1986)) (holding that there was no express assumption of risk because “[r]iding on a track with a
negligently placed exit gap is not an inherent risk in the sport of horse racing.”)).
311
Mazzeo v. City of Sebastian, 550 So. 2d 1113, 1116 (Fla. 1989); McNichol, 44 So. 3d at 257.
312
See, e.g., Mazzeo, 550 So. 2d at 1116–17; Ashcroft, 492 So. 2d at 1311.
313
McNichol, 44 So. 3d at 257.
314
See Mazzeo, 550 So. 2d at 1116–17.
315
LeNoble v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 663 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 1995) (citing Meulners v. Hawkes, 216
N.W.2d 633, 635 (Minn. 1974)).
308
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of injuring herself” and “did not expressly agree to absolve the city of
any liability if she did.”316 In the 1993 Florida Court of Appeals decision
Nova University v. Katz a cheerleader injured herself by performing
a stunt even though “she knew spotters were not present.”317 The
court held the cheerleader did not assume the risk of lack of proper
instruction and supervision, and therefore refused to bar the suit based
on participatory EAR.318 Whether the plaintiff subjectively assumed a
particular inherent risk is a fact issue, subject to determination by a
jury.319
As a result of the above, it is undisputable that the Space Activities
Statute, which attempts to codify a version of the abolished PAR
defense for spaceflight entities is at least slight progress towards the
legislature’s goal of immunizing spaceflight entities.
D. New Mexico
1. Space Activities Statute
The New Mexico Space Activities Statute only applies to the FAA
license holder, thereby excluding manufacturers and suppliers from
the limited liability provided by statute.320 In early 2013 some New
Mexico legislators agreed to amend New Mexico’s Space Activities
Statute to expand its scope to include manufacturers and suppliers.
321
The expansion was encouraged by, among others, Virgin Galactic
and opposed, among others, by the New Mexico Trial Lawyers
Association.322 Eventually, the two sides reached a compromise, and
“[i]t took several months of tough negotiations but both parties have
agreed to amend current state law.”323 The law would have also allowed
SFP’s to sue for negligence and malintent, which they currently cannot
do.324 The amendment stalled in the New Mexico Senate when it failed
to garner approval of the Judiciary Committee.325 For now, there is no
Mazzeo, 550 So. 2d at 1116–17.
Nova Univ. Inc. v. Katz, 636 So. 2d 729, 729 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (emphasis added).
318
Id. at 730 (citing Ashcroft v. Calder Race Course, 492 So. 2d 1309, 1311 (Fla. 1986)).
319
LeNoble, 663 So. 2d at 1352.
320
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-14-2(C) (2013).
321
Vanessa de la Vina, NM legislators reach compromise on spaceport liability bill, KVIA News (Jan.
24, 2013, 8:01 AM), http://www.kvia.com/news/NM-legislators-reach-compromise-on-spaceportliability-bill/-/391068/18255874/-/13aibv9/-/index.html.
322
Id.
323
Id.
324
Id.
325
James Monteleone, Senate Committee Grounds Spaceport Liability Exemption, ABQ Journal
(Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.abqjournal.com/main/2012/02/07/abqnewsseeker/senate-committeegrounds-spaceport-liability-exemption.html; J. Foust, New Mexico Liability Law Update Stalled,
NewSpace Journal, Feb. 8, 2012, available at http://www.newspacejournal.com/2012/02/08/newmexico-liability-law-update-stalled/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2013).
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indication the amendment is close to passing.
The Space Activities Statute defines participant by adopting the
Launch Act’s definition of SFP.326 Likewise, the New Mexico legislature
adopted the federal definition of spaceflight activities.327 Under the
New Mexico Space Activities Statute, a spaceflight entity is not liable
for injury to or death of a participant resulting from the “inherent
risks” of spaceflight activities so long as the warning contained in
the Space Activities Statute is distributed and signed as required.328
However, the statute also includes language whereby an SFP or an
SFP’s representative cannot sue a spaceflight entity for loss, damage
or death “resulting exclusively from any of the inherent risks of space
flight activities.”329 This raises the issue of whether injuries resulting
from both inherent and non-inherent risks are not covered by the statute
because they are not “exclusively” caused by inherent risks. This is
inartful drafting that creates an ambiguity and possibly a loophole to
immunity when several causes converge to create an injury.
By enacting the Space Activities Statute, the New Mexico legislature
sought to immunize spaceflight entities as long as they do not commit
acts or omissions that constitute either gross negligence or willful or
wanton disregard for an SFP’s safety.330 In addition, the Space Activities
Statute does not provide immunity if the space flight entity knows or
has reason to know of the dangerous condition that proximately causes
the injury.331 The degree of culpability described by “knew or should
have known” is ambiguous. In New Mexico, criminal negligence
encompasses objective or subjective knowledge of the risk, i.e., knew or
should have known, and requires “reckless disregard” of a “substantial
and foreseeable risk.”332 So the standard in the Space Activities Statute
is not quite criminal negligence. However, the same standard is used
in “negligent supervision,” which is proven if an employer knew or
reasonably should have known that some harm might be caused by
the acts or omissions of the employee who is entrusted with such
position.333 Therefore, at the very least, there is ambiguity about what
degree of culpability is immunized under the statute. Lastly, New
Mexico—like every other state—does not immunize injuries resulting
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-14-2(A).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-14-2(B).
328
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-14-3(A).
329
Id. (emphasis added).
330
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-14-3; Cal. Civ. Code § 2212(b), (c).
331
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-14-3; Cal. Civ. Code § 2212(c).
332
State v. Chavez, 173 P.3d 48, 53 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Gonzales, 2011-NMCA-081, 150
N.M. 494, 263 P.3d 271, 276, aff’d on other grounds, 2013-NMSC-016, 301 P.3d 380.
333
Los Ranchitos v. Tierra Grande, Inc., 861 P.2d 263, 269 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).
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from intentional acts.334
2. Statutes Limiting Liability
a. Equine Activities
Spaceflight entities attempting to gauge the effectiveness of the
New Mexico Space Activities Statutes by looking at application of
New Mexico’s ELA will be disappointed. Only one New Mexico case,
Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., cites the ELA.335 And Berlangieri deals
exclusively with the effectiveness of an exculpatory clause in light of
the immunities granted by the statute.336 It does not apply the ELA per
se. As a result, there is no guidance from New Mexico common law
with respect to statutory limited liability.
b. Skiing
New Mexico’s SLA provides a little more guidance. However,
spaceflight entities reviewing New Mexico law should take SLA case
law with a grain of salt. The SLA is admittedly more safety-oriented than
the Space Activities Statute. And the SLA imposes affirmative duties
on operators, while the Space Activities Statute does not. These two
characteristics alone make it somewhat inappropriate to apply case law
interpreting the SLA to predict interpretation of the Space Activities
Statute. In fact, New Mexico courts have more so than others focused on
the SLA’s stated goal of increasing the safety of ski areas,337 and this has
affected the way New Mexico courts interpret claims brought under it.
Luckily for spaceflight entities this attenuates the ability to analogize it
to the Space Activities Statute. Further, the case law is scarce and dates
back to 1992, further making reliance on it tenuous.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals holds that, if applicable, the
SLA is the sole avenue for deciding a plaintiff’s claims.338 Therefore, a
plaintiff can only recover under the SLA or under theories of negligence,
but not both.339 If this applies to spaceflight entities, SFPs will clearly
be limited in their potential recovery. Further, the New Mexico Court
of Appeals holds that the SLA codified “primary assumption of risk”
or PAR, whereby a defendant either has no duty or did not breach a
duty owed to the plaintiff.340 But this codification is not without some
334
335
336
337
338
339
340

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-14-3; Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 2212(c).
See Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 2003-NMSC-024, 134 N.M. 341, 343, 76 P.3d 1098, 1100.
See generally id. at 1100.
Lopez v. Ski Apache Resort, 836 P.2d 648, 656 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).
Id. at 651.
Id.
Id. at 653–54.
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qualifications.341 In the New Mexico SLA, PAR is qualified in situations
where a ski area operator is alleged to have breached a duty under the
SLA.342 As a result, the SLA does not prevent a court from apportioning
liability among the ski operator and the skier using comparative
negligence where there is a question as to whether both of them
breached duties imposed on them by the SLA.343 This, in simpler terms,
means that the court will engage in a negligence determination—
which is fact intensive and not done as a matter of law—even if claims
are brought under the SLA. The SLA will not, therefore, necessarily
allow for pre-trial disposition claims. This curtails the advantages
theoretically granted by statutory immunity.
Extending these concepts to the New Mexico Space Activities Act
means that a New Mexico court could either aid or hinder the legislature
in its efforts to limit a spaceflight entities’ liability. If a New Mexico
court simply decides to apportion liability under the Space Activities
Statute—which precedent allows it to do—then spaceflight entities
are no better off under the statute than they were under common law.
The New Mexico courts’ position that the SLA codified a “qualified”
version of PAR can be reduced to a mere codification of SAR. This is
presumably not the result the legislature intended when it passed the
Space Activities Statute.
On the other hand, New Mexico courts could readily distinguish
the SLA and the Space Activities Statute to the advantage of spaceflight
entities. The reason the New Mexico Court of Appeals found PAR
was qualified in the SLA was because the statute creates duties for the
ski operators.344 The Space Activities Statute only requires a written
warning. It does not create any additional duties, the way the SLA does,
for example by requiring ski operators to correct specific hazards.345 As
a result, a New Mexico court could find that the Space Activities Statute
codifies PAR, but does not qualify it. If a court reaches that result, the
legislature will have very effectively codified immunity for spaceflight
entities. This is not a foregone conclusion, however. The legislature
could have clarified its codification of PAR with explicit language,
thereby removing uncertainty.
The New Mexico Courts of Appeals also view a determination
of whether an operator violated the duties imposed by the SLA as a
341
342
343
344
345

Id. at 651.
Lopez, 836 P.2d at 651.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 655.
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fact issue.346 In one particular case, Lopez v. Ski Apache Resort, the New
Mexico Court of Appeals held that a ski tower (a massive, extremely
common and indeed necessary object) was an “unusual” obstacle or
hazard under the statute.347 And therefore a jury needed to determine
whether it was “feasible” for the ski resort to warn or correct the
hazard.348 Hopefully, this should not apply to Space Activities Statutes
because they do not impose duties on spaceflight operators. But, if
an issue arises about whether the SFP received an adequate warning
statement—which is the only requirement under the Space Activities
statute—is a fact issue, spaceflight entities will be further precluded
from pre-trial disposition of the plaintiffs’ claims.
3. Express Assumption of Risk
New Mexico courts will generally enforce exculpatory agreements,
even for a party’s negligence, unless they are “violative of law or contrary
to some rule of public policy.” 349 And, as a general principle, New Mexico
courts apply EAR when enforcing exculpatory agreements because it is
a “means of effectuating an agreement between the parties.”350 This rule
does not generally apply to reckless conduct.351 The rule also does not
apply under certain “other” circumstances, which include situations
where public policy, furnished either through statute or common law,
weighs against enforcement. This second issue raises issues relevant to
spaceflight activities, and was tackled in Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp.
where a New Mexico court used the existence of the ELA to invalidate
an exculpatory provision for horseback riding activities.
The New Mexico SLA does not contain language that the skier has
to sign nor does it have specific language for warnings to be posted.352
Similarly, the New Mexico ELA also does not have language to be signed,
but it does, however, include an obligation to post a warning notice.353
The statute does not tell operators what language to use and it does not
require the rider to sign a copy of the warning statement. Therefore,
the following analysis looks at exculpatory provisions independently
drafted by equine operators. The Space Activities Statute requires the
following language to be signed by the SFP:
Id. at 656.
Lopez, 836 P.2d at 656.
348
Id.
349
Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 2003-NMSC-024, 134 N.M. 341, 343, 76 P.3d 1098, 1104 (citing
Sw. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Artesia Alfalfa Growers’ Ass’n, 353 P.2d 62, 69 (N.M. 1960); accord Lynch v.
Santa Fe Nat’l Bank, 627 P.2d 1247, 1251 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981)).
350
Id. at 1106 (citing Thompson v. Ruidoso–Sunland, Inc., 734 P.2d 267, 272 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987)).
351
Id. at 1104 (citing Baker v. Bhajan, 871 P.2d 374, 377 n.1 (N.M. 1994)).
352
See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-15-2 (1997).
353
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 42-13-5.
346
347
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WARNING AND
ACKNOWLEDGMENT:
I understand and acknowledge that
under New Mexico law, there is no
liability for injury to or death sustained
by a participant in a space flight activity
provided by a space flight entity if the
injury or death results from the inherent
risks of the space flight activity. Injuries
caused by the inherent risks of space
flight activities may include, among
others, death, bodily injury, emotional
injury or property damage. I assume all
risk of participating in this space flight
activity.
New Mexico courts engage in a two-step analysis to determine
the validity of exculpatory provisions: 1) a linguistic analysis of the
exculpatory clause; and 2) a public policy assessment of the provision.
The linguistic analysis encompasses determinations of the clause’s
conspicuousness and clarity. First, as is the case in many other states,
exculpatory clauses are strictly construed against the drafter.354
The specific language of the release must be sufficiently clear and
unambiguous to “inform the person signing it of its meaning.”355 This
“strict construction of liability releases” also requires “such clarity that
a person without legal training [could] understand the agreement he
or she [had] made.”356 In addition to the language itself, “the words
surrounding the portion being construed and the circumstances
surrounding the agreement are relevant.”357 Further, drafters of releases
should “err on the side of using clear terms, understandable by the
general public, rather than legal terminology.”358
A clause is conspicuous, “[w]hen a reasonable person against whom
a clause is to operate ought to have noticed it . . . .”359 For example, a
release that is part of a “very short document” and is “appropriately
Berlangieri, 76 P.3d at 1107 (citing Lynch, 627 P.2d at 1249).
Id. (internal citations omitted).
356
Id. at 1108.
357
Id.
358
Id. at 1110 (citing Day v. Snowmass Stables, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 289, 294–95 (D. Colo. 1993)
(holding that a liability release was invalid because it did not explain the specific risks being
assumed by the person who signed it).
359
Berlangieri, 76 P.3d at 1108–09 (citing Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d
505, 511 (Tex. 1993)).
354
355
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labeled” is conspicuous.360 It also helps if the operator’s employees
bring it to the participant’s attention and ask if she understood it.361
In Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., the plaintiff was injured during
a horseback ride; prior to the ride, the plaintiff signed a release.362 The
release, which at the time of signing the plaintiff said she understood,
included the following language:
Agreement for Release and Assumption
of Risk
The undersigned, being over the age of
18, (or if under the age of 18, through my
natural parent or legal guardian) hereby
agree with THE LODGE AT CHAMA.
I acknowledge that I have been informed
of, and that I am otherwise aware of, the
risks involved in fishing, horseback riding,
hiking and shooting the sporting clays on
the lands of THE LODGE AT CHAMA.
I hereby declare that I possess sufficient
skills and experience in the above
mentioned activities without causing
injury to myself or other guests of THE
LODGE AT CHAMA.
In consideration of being permitted
to participate in the above mentioned
activities and otherwise use the lands of
THE LODGE AT CHAMA, I agree:
To use due care while engaging in the
above mentioned activities on the lands
of THE LODGE AT CHAMA, including,
but not limited to, each and every risk
resulting from negligent acts or omissions
of any other person or persons, including
employees and agents of THE LODGE
AT CHAMA. I further agree to exculpate
and relieve THE LODGE AT CHAMA
and its employees, representatives and
360
361
362

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1101.
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agents, from all liability for any loss,
damage, or injury, whether to person
or property which I may suffer while
engaging in activities and/or using the lands
of THE LODGE AT CHAMA all whether
or not resulting from the negligent act or
omission of another person or persons.363
The New Mexico court deemed most of the language in the release,
“unintelligible and unhelpful.”364 The court then focused on the last
sentence, starting with “I further agree . . .” and ending with “from
the negligent act or omission of another person or persons.” The court
held this sentence exceedingly long, “so long that a guest could forget
what the first part of the sentence says by the time the guest reached
the end of the sentence.”365 Despite its misgivings, the New Mexico
Supreme Court determined that, reading it carefully enough, a guest
would be able to understand its meaning.366 And that the sentence, on
balance, only had one reasonable interpretation, “it [wa]s an agreement
not to sue [the defendant] for injuries caused by the negligence of the
[defendant’s] employees.”367 With respect to the title of the release,
the court was unimpressed by the use of the words “Assumption of
Risk,” finding the expression to be a legal phrase a lay person would
not be expected to understand.368 And on its own, it would be wholly
insufficient to uphold a release.369 But because it was part of the rest of
the document, the term was a “helpful signal.”370
From this perspective, the Space Activities Statute warning
statement seems to comply with New Mexico law on exculpatory
provisions:
WARNING AND
ACKNOWLEDGMENT:
I understand and acknowledge that
under New Mexico law, there is no
liability for injury to or death sustained
by a participant in a space flight activity
provided by a space flight entity if the
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370

Id. (highlighting added).
Berlangieri, 76 P.3d at 1108.
Id. at 1109.
Id. at 1108-09.
Id.
Id.
Berlangieri, 76 P.3d at 1109.
Id.
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injury or death results from the inherent
risks of the space flight activity. Injuries
caused by the inherent risks of space flight
activities may include, among others,
death, bodily injury, emotional injury
or property damage. I assume all risk of
participating in this space flight activity.

The warning statement does not contain legalese. Nor is it overly long
(84 words). The New Mexico Supreme Court in Berlangieri paid little
attention to particular words or whether the release was broad enough.
The entire focus of the inquiry was clarity and conspicuousness. From
that perspective, the Space Activities Statute satisfies both requirements.
Obviously, spaceflight entities would have to be mindful of placement
of the warning statement and should avoid burying it under pages of
documents or inside another long document. But overall, there are no
red flags—based on the available common law—with respect to the
warning statement itself.
The second step for a New Mexico court’s analysis of an
exculpatory clause is based on public policy. And this is where the
legislature committed a major oversight which could significantly
hinder spaceflight entities’ ability to immunize themselves if the Space
Activities Statute does not apply to them. The New Mexico Supreme
Court determined whether an exculpatory provision is unenforceable
as against public policy by applying the Lynch factors.371 The Lynch
factors are not a balancing test but rather only indicators to guide
whether “enforcement of the release would be unjust.”372 Under New
Mexico law, public policy favoring invalidation of a release can be
based in either statutory or common law.373
The ELA imposes duties on equine business operators to protect
their patrons by expressly excluding certain acts or omissions from
immunity.374 The New Mexico Supreme Court will look to statutes
governing the particular activity (for example, the ELA) and determine
whether the statute, “generally expresses a policy that the duty of
ordinary care may not be disclaimed . . . .”375 Under New Mexico
common law, if the legislature expressly excludes an operator’s
negligence from the statute’s immunity, this indicates the legislature’s
371
372
373
374
375

Id. (citing Lynch, 627 P.2d at 1251–52).
Id. at 1109–10.
Id. at 1109 (citing Lynch, 627 P.2d at 1251–52).
Berlangieri, 76 P.3d at 1110 (citing N.M. Stat. Ann. 1978, § 42–13–4 (1993) (emphasis added)).
Id.
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intent that operators be held accountable for it.376
For example, in Berlangieri, the New Mexico Supreme Court looked
at Subsections A, B, and C of the ELA and identified risks for which the
operator did not have immunity.377 Subsection A of the ELA provides
that operators are liable for equine behavior.378 Subsection B bars a
cause of action unless the action is based on the operator’s negligence.379
Subsection C provides specific causes of injury not intended to be
excluded by either Subsection A or B.380 The New Mexico Supreme
Court concluded that all of the examples of risks from which the
operators are immune refer to acts by the horse, i.e. equine behavior.381
Thus, according to the court, the ELA reflects a policy that operators
should be held liable for their own negligence, but not for events
beyond their control.382 As a result, allowing operators to contractually
exculpate themselves would run contrary to public policy.
In addition, if a statute only codifies common law, a “more
reasonable interpretation of th[e] statute is that the Legislature intended
to express in general terms a public policy that operators should be held
accountable for their own negligence, recklessness, and intentional
conduct.”383 As a result, an operator’s attempt to contractually protect
itself for its own negligence is void as against public policy. In other
words, under New Mexico law a statute limiting liability is a ceiling for
exculpatory provisions, rather than a floor. Therefore, when the New
Mexico legislature enacted the Space Activities Statute, it created a
limit on spaceflight entities’ ability to exculpate themselves by contract.
Given New Mexico’s very pro-commercial-space stance, this is
probably an unintended consequence. To remedy this, the legislature
could try to increase the scope of culpability covered by the statute
or, alternatively, explicitly state that the Space Activities Statute
does not otherwise limit the scope of exculpatory agreements. The
New Mexico Space Activities Statute does state that the limitation
on legal liability it provides is “in addition to any other limitation
of legal liability otherwise provided by law.”384 This sentence has no
effect on spaceflight entities’ exculpatory provisions. The exculpatory
provisions would have been more protective than the statute allows.
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384

Id. at 1111–12.
Id.
Id.
Berlangieri, 76 P.3d at 1111–12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1111.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-14-3(C).
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So it is unclear how the statute can be “in addition” to the exculpatory
provisions. The problem is that the statement assumes the existence of
other lesser forms of limitation on liability. But that is not the case (as
seen above). Therefore, it is unclear what practical effect the statement
has on any aspect of spaceflight entities’ liability.
In Berlangieri, the defendant tried to rely on the ELA’s “Legislative
purpose and findings” because the latter states that the legislature’s
purpose was to encourage operators’ engagement in equine activities
by limiting liability for injuries resulting from equine behavior:
The legislature recognizes that persons
who participate in or observe equine
activities may incur injuries as a result
of the numerous inherent risks involved
in such activities. The legislature also
finds that the state and its citizens
derive numerous personal and economic
benefits from such activities. It is the
purpose of the legislature to encourage
owners,
trainers,
operators
and
promoters to sponsor or engage in equine
activities by providing that no person
shall recover for injuries resulting from
the risks related to the behavior of equine
animals while engaged in any equine
activities.385
The New Mexico Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument,
finding such a reading of the text too narrow.386 Rather, the court
held this language as an attempt to balance the competing interests of
operators and participants.387 And that allowing participants to hold
operators accountable for their negligence promoted such balancing.388
What is maybe worse for spaceflight entities is that a 2009 proposed
text of the Space Activities Statute addresses each of the issues raised
in Berlangieri.389 The 2009 text proposed by Clinton D. Harden has
“Legislative Findings and Purpose,” much like the ELA.390 The
Berlangieri, 76 P.3d at 1112 (citing N.M. Stat. Ann. § 42–13–2 (1993) (emphasis added)).
Id.
387
Id.
388
Id.
389
S. 37, 49 Gen. Ct. (N. M. 2009), available at http://nmlegis.gov/Sessions/09%20Regular/bills/
senate/SB0037.pdf (last accessed Apr. 2, 2013)
390
Id.
385
386
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Legislative Findings and Purpose include a statement that commercial
human spaceflight has inherent risks which cannot be eliminated by the
use of ordinary care, and therefore “justify the exculpation of ordinary
negligence.”391 One of the identified purposes of the Space Activities
Statute would be to “permit the use of waivers and releases of liability
for space flight entities that will exculpate them from the inherent risks
of space flight activities and their negligence.” 392 That text did not make
it into law. And courts may interpret that as legislative rejection of its
contents, which is presumably worse than silence.
In addition to the public policy analysis above, described above, the
New Mexico courts supplement their determination by applying the
Tunkl factors, which are as follows:
[1] The activity concerns a business of a type generally
thought suitable for public regulation.
[2] The party seeking exculpation is engaged in
performing a service of great importance to the
public, which is often a matter of practical necessity
for some members of the public.
[3] The party holds himself [or herself] out as willing
to perform this service for any member of the public
who seeks it, or at least for any member coming
within certain established standards.
[4] As a result of the essential nature of the service, in
the economic setting of the transaction, the party
invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage
of bargaining strength against any member of the
public who seeks his [or her] services.
[5] In exercising a superior bargaining power the party
confronts the public with a standardized adhesion
contract of exculpation, and makes no provision
whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable
fees and obtain protection against negligence.
[6] Finally, as a result of the transaction, the person or
property of the purchaser is placed under the control
of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness by the

391
392

Id.
Id.
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seller or his [or her] agents.393

With respect to the first Tunkl factor, public regulation of the
activity, the existence of a statute governing the activity, such as the
ELA, in and of itself indicates “suitability for public regulation.”394 This
would also be the case for spaceflight activities, in light of the Space
Activities Statute.
In the case of horseback riding, the second Tunkl factor, pertaining
to whether the defendant is “performing a service of great importance
to the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for some
members of the public,” weighs in favor of enforcement.395 Horseback
riding is not a “public necessity.”396 It is recreational. The same can
be said for spaceflight activities as currently envisioned. Later, when
spaceflight activities provide point-to-point transportation, the analysis
could change. But for now, providing trips to the ISS and suborbital
flights—for tourism or research—is not a service of public necessity.
With respect to the third Tunkl factor, an equine operator generally
holds himself out as “willing to perform this service for any member
of the public who [sought] it, or at least for any member coming within
certain established standards.”397 This would likely also be the case
for spaceflight entities offering commercial flights to SFPs. So far, the
various business models—such as Virgin Galactic’s—advertise to the
public and invite all members of the population to fly.398
The fourth Tunkl factor relates to whether the defendant exercised
“a superior bargaining power” against the plaintiff.399 The second and
fourth factors are closely related because superior bargaining power is
more likely to exist when the service offered is of public necessity.400 In
Berlangieri¸ the court found there was an adhesion contract—evidence
of superior bargaining power—but that the plaintiff was not obligated
to go horseback riding, and therefore was not necessarily subjected
to the superior bargaining power. In the spaceflight activity context,
parties could negotiate their agreements. But even if they don’t, the
parties seeking spaceflight services—at the moment—are paying close
to $200,000. The lowest quoted price for suborbital flights is $90,000 per
person. It is unlikely that individuals with such financial resources are
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400

Berlangieri, 76 P.3d at 1109–10 (quoting Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445–46).
Id. at 1112–13.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Booking, Virgin Galactic, http://www.virgingalactic.com/booking/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2014).
Berlangieri, 76 P.3d at 1113.
Id.
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in a “weak” bargaining power. Further, given the investment required,
this is most definitely an optional service. As a result, in the currently
envisioned setting, spaceflight activities would not trigger the second
and fourth Tunkl factors.
The fifth Tunkl factor, whether a participant is subjected to an
adhesion contract and whether a provision allows him to purchase
additional protection against the operator’s negligence, will weigh
in favor of invalidation, if the defendant did not offer a way for the
plaintiff to purchase additional coverage.401 There is no indication as
to whether spaceflight entities currently offer additional coverage, but
they certainly are free to do so if they wish so. As a result, spaceflight
entities could push this factor in favor of enforcing any release.
Lastly, the sixth Tunkl factor, whether a participant is subjected to
operator’s risk of carelessness, can weigh in favor of invalidation if,
by virtue of the release, the participant is “subject to the risk of [the
defendant’s] carelessness.”402 This last factor is problematic. If an entity
triggers this factor—which favors invalidation of the release—merely
by requiring a release for its “carelessness,” then the factor will always
be triggered. The sixth factor becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The
Space Activities Statute requires the following language:
WARNING AND
ACKNOWLEDGMENT:
I understand and acknowledge that
under New Mexico law, there is no
liability for injury to or death sustained
by a participant in a space flight activity
provided by a space flight entity if the
injury or death results from the inherent
risks of the space flight activity. Injuries
caused by the inherent risks of space
flight activities may include, among
others, death, bodily injury, emotional
injury or property damage. I assume all
risk of participating in this space flight
activity.
The text does not discuss the spaceflight entities’ culpability; it merely
discusses “the inherent risks of space flight activity.” Courts will have to
401
402

Id. at 1112–13.
Id.
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determine whether “the inherent risks of space flight activity” include
negligence. If they do, the release triggers the sixth Tunkl factor. If they
don’t, then the sixth factor is not triggered. Further, if the spaceflight
entity requires only signature of the Space Activities Statute warning
statement, then the analysis can go either way, but the spaceflight entity
is then foreclosed from contractually immunizing itself for carelessness.
This turns the exercise into a Catch-22.
The New Mexico legislature should take into consideration
Berlangieri as New Mexico continues to court commercial space entities.
The Space Activities Statute and the ELA, in this case, have significant
similarities. Most of all, if the New Mexico Supreme Court read the
Space Activities Statute as limiting an operator’s ability to exculpate
itself by contract—even if the participant is fully informed and freely
chooses to do so—the courts could perform the same after-the-fact
undoing of exculpatory agreements between spaceflight entities and
SFPs. The legislature should have, and still could, address the New
Mexico Supreme Court’s use of a statute limiting liability as creating a
limitation on an operator’s ability to contractually exculpate itself. As
it stands, the Space Activities Statute could actually be a hindrance at
common law. The New Mexico court could also try to include language
in the Space Activities Statute to affect the Tunkl analysis and skewing it
in favor of spaceflight entities, if that is its intention. However, in light
of the analysis above, the Tunkl factors would otherwise weigh in favor
of enforcing an exculpatory provision between a spaceflight entity and
an SFP. Therefore, in that regards, the New Mexico Space Activities
Statute does not provide any additional assistance to spaceflight
entities and actually hinders spaceflight entities in the exercise of EAR.
4. Implied Assumption of Risk
Although New Mexico’s definitions of PAR and SAR are very
similar to California’s, New Mexico’s approach to assumption of risk
principles is anything but. New Mexico defines PAR in the standard
way, “[PAR] is an alternative expression for the proposition that the
defendant either owed no duty to the plaintiff or did not breach a
duty.”403 But SAR, which in the words of the Supreme Court is nothing
more than “contributory negligence,”404 was abolished in 1971.405
Baldonado v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 2008-NMCA-010, ¶ 11, 143 N.M. 297, 176 P.3d 286, aff’d,
2008-NMSC-005, 143 N.M. 288, 176 P.3d 277 (citing Yount v. Johnson, 1996-NMCA-046, 121 N.M.
585, 915 P.2d 341). See also Moreno v. Marrs, 695 P.2d 1322 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (describing the
term “assumption of risk” as used in its “primary sense,” whereby there is no duty); Thompson v.
Ruidoso–Sunland, Inc., 734 P.2d 267, 271 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987).
404
Baldonado, 176 P.3d at 291 (internal citation omitted).
405
Lopez v. Ski Apache Resort, 836 P.2d 648, 653 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992). See Williamson v. Smith,
403
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Under New Mexico law PAR exists in the context of contact sport,
“where participants owe no duty of reasonable care as long as the game
is played in the ordinary way,” because “the participants enter the field
with an express or implied consent that duty will be defined narrowly
as a matter of judicial policy.”406 And PAR itself, i.e. the declaration of
no duty, is a matter of policy, “Policy determines duty.”407
As a matter of policy, more recent New Mexico Court of Appeals’
decisions evidence a move away from immunity. For example, in
1996 the New Mexico Court of Appeals summarized the state’s
jurisprudential trend as, “mov[ing] forcefully towards a public policy
that defines duty under a universal standard of ordinary care, a
standard which holds all citizens accountable for the reasonableness
of their actions.”408 It specifically identified this trend as a movement
away from immunity in favor of holding everyone responsible for
the safety of others. The New Mexico Court of Appeals reflected on
the trend as follow, “The movement has been away from judicially
declared immunity or protectionism, whether of a special class, group,
or activity. The theme, constantly reiterated, is that ‘every person has
a duty to exercise ordinary care for the safety of others.”409 In addition
to identifying and pronouncing a New Mexico policy contrary to the
principles of PAR, the court also described the distinct advantages of
comparative negligence.410 Comparative negligence is SAR because
a jury is allowed to apportion fault, “we are also reminded of the
‘ameliorative principles of comparative negligence, which strongly
favor letting a jury determine the relative accountability of our citizens
for an injury.”411 In the court’s opinion comparative negligence is
better suited for a determination because it, “‘provides the means for
more subtle adjustments’ by the jury in the evaluating the vicissitudes
of human behavior.’”412 In this respect, the legislature improved the
situation for spaceflight entities by enacting the Space Activities Statute.
The Space Activities Statute both clearly gives spaceflight entities the
benefit of PAR and sends a clear message about the legislature’s position
regarding spaceflight entities’ immunity.
491 P.2d 1147 (N.M. 1971) (internal citations omitted); Diaz v. MacMahon, 819 P.2d 1346, 1348 n.2
(N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (recognizing the abolition of SAR and the viability of PAR as a defense after
Williamson); Thompson, 734 P.2d at 271 (same).
406
Yount, 915 P.2d at 346–47 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (citations omitted).
407
Id. at 347 (citing Torres v. State, 894 P.2d 386, 389 (N.M. 1995)).
408
Id. at 342.
409
Id. at 342 (quoting Lerma ex rel. Lerma v. State Highway Dep’t, 877 P.2d 1085, 1087 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1994).
410
Yount, 915 P.2d at 342–43 (quoting Montoya v. AKAL Sec., Inc., 838 P.2d 971, 974 (N.M. 1992).
411
Id. at 342–43 (quoting Montoya v. AKAL Sec., Inc., 838 P.2d 971, 974 (N.M. 1992).
412
Id. (citing 4 Fowler V. Harper, Fleming James, Jr. & Oscar S. Gray, The Law of Torts § 21.1
n.14, at 204 (2d ed. 1986)).
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In 1987 the New Mexico Court of Appeals considered the case
Thompson v. Ruidoso-Sunland, Inc.413 where the plaintiff was riding on a
horse track and got injured due to an “unguarded gooseneck rail” along
the race track.414 The defendant argued, among other defenses, PAR.415
Relying on state law enacted by the New Mexico Racing Commission
and a landowner’s common law duty to a business invitee, the court
held that the defendant had a duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent
injury to the plaintiff.416 And that the defendant’s knowledge of the
danger posed by the unguarded gooseneck rail and its failure to take
adequate, available precautions to protect plaintiff supported the trial
court’s finding of a breach of that duty.417 Thompson exemplifies an
extremely narrow application of PAR, making it virtually impossible
to apply when there are other statutes involved, which may explain the
scarcity of case law on the topic. With respect to spaceflight entities,
Thompson raises the question of whether the New Mexico courts would
read a duty into the Space Activities Statute precluding application of
PAR. The legislature did not address this in the New Mexico Space
Activities Statute. And although the Space Activities Statutes does not,
on its face, impose such duties and only talks about limiting liability for
spaceflight entities it does not preclude Thompson-like analyses.
Further, the mere enactment of the Space Activities Statute as a tool
of immunity will not support an argument by the spaceflight entities
that PAR should be applied to spaceflight activities at common law. In
a 1992 New Mexico Court of Appeals case, Lopez the plaintiff skied into
a ski tower and sued the ski resort operator, among other defendants.
The defendants argued that the New Mexico SLA codified PAR for ski
resort operators.418 To the contrary, the court found that the language
of the SLA supported an application of comparative negligence.419
The main thrust of the New Mexico court’s holding was that the SLA:
1) creates duties for ski resort operators and skiers; and 2) where it
does codify PAR for ski operators, the SLA does so subject to the ski
operator’s compliance with the SLA.420 This creates duties for both
skiers and operators.421 Under New Mexico law when both parties are
alleged to have breached duties PAR does not apply.422 In that case, the
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422

Thompson v. Ruidoso–Sunland, Inc., 734 P.2d 267, 271 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing NMSA 1978, UJI Civ. 13.10 (Repl. Pamp. 1980)).
Id.
Lopez v. Ski Apache Resort, 836 P.2d 648, 653 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).
Id. at 653–54 (quoting and citing N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-15-10).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-15-10 (1997) (emphasis added).
Lopez, 36 P.2d at 654–55.
Id.

Vol. 6.1

Legislation & Policy Brief

109

“fact finder is entitled to determine the negligence, if any, of each of
the parties, and in the event both parties are found to have negligently
violated a duty under the Act contributing to the skier’s injuries, to
apportion fault and damages between the parties under comparative
negligence principles.”423
The legislature, by limiting immunity under certain circumstances,
may have hindered the sought after effectiveness of the Space Activities
Statute more than it realized. The Space Activities Statute limits
immunity if the spaceflight entity is grossly negligent, shows wanton
or willful disregard, or knows or “reasonably should have known” of
a danger that causes the injury. Further, as stated above, immunity
is contingent on obtaining a signed warning statement from the SFP.
These limitations can be interpreted as qualifiers, which would defeat
the argument that the Space Activities Statute codifies PAR.
There are, however, two powerful counterarguments to this, which
strongly support a reading that the statute incorporates PAR. First, the
Space Activities Statute does not impose affirmative duties—the way
they are imposed in the SLA—and therefore is consistent with PAR.
Also, under PAR an operator cannot increase the inherent risks of an
activity but it has no duty to decrease them. Stating that an operator
cannot commit gross negligence or show wanton or willful disregard
or act recklessly by encountering risks it knew of are merely other
ways to say the same thing, further making the Space Activities Statute
consistent with PAR. The limitation on an operator’s liability for risks
he “knew of reasonably should have known about” may require
more finessing. It is unclear whether this refers to recklessness or
mere negligence. But either way, if it refers to non-inherent risks it is
consistent with PAR: an operator cannot increase the inherent risks of an
activity. If the language includes inherent risks, i.e. an operator knows
or should have known of an inherent risk and did nothing about it, then
the limitation is inconsistent with PAR. A spaceflight entity can make
a very strong argument that the Space Activities Statute codifies PAR.
If it codifies PAR, New Mexico has legislatively announced a policy of
“no duty” for spaceflight entities. This was the lynchpin argument the
defendant did not have in Lopez to support his contention that PAR
should apply to the plaintiff’s injuries.

423

Id.
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1. Space Activities Statute

In Texas, the term “spaceflight entity” includes the FAA license
holder, manufacturers and suppliers reviewed by the FAA during the
licensing process.424 But Texas further expands the definition to include
the employees, officers, directors, owners, stockholders, members,
managers, and partners of manufacturers, FAA license holders, and
suppliers.425
Texas incorporated the Launch Act’s definition of SFP wordfor-word, without referencing the federal statute.426 With respect to
spaceflight activities, the Texas legislature merged the equivalent of the
federal definitions for “launch” and “launch services” in the definition
of a single term “launch”:
(1)

“Launch” means a placement or attempted
placement of a vehicle or rocket and any payload,
crew, or space flight participant in a suborbital
trajectory, earth orbit, or outer space, including
activities involved in the preparation of a launch
vehicle or payload for launch.427

And Texas’s definition of reentry is near-identical in form, and
substantively identical to, the federal definition of “reenter and
reentry.”428
Texas law also has the term “space flight activities,” which does not
exist in federal law. Under Texas law, a “space flight activity” means
everything done in preparation for “space flight” (an undefined term),
and includes activities taking place between a launch and a reentry:
(3)

“Space flight activities” means activities
and training in all phases of preparing for
and undertaking space flight, including:
(A)

424
425
426
427
428

the preparation of a launch
vehicle, payload, crew, or space
flight participant for launch,
space flight, and reentry;

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 100A.001(4) (West 2013).
Id.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 100A.001(6).
Compare Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 100A.001 with 51 U.S.C. § 50902(4), (6) (2010).
Compare Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 100A.001 with 51 U.S.C. § 50902(13).
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(B)

the conduct of the launch;

(C)

conduct occurring between the
launch and reentry;

(D)

the preparation of a reentry
vehicle, payload, crew, or space
flight participant for reentry;

(E)

the conduct of reentry
descent;

(F)

the conduct of the landing; and

(G)

the conduct of postlanding
recovery of a reentry vehicle,
payload, crew, or space flight
participant.429

and

Items 3(A), (B), (D), and (E) are subsumed in the federal definitions
of “launch,” “launch services,” and “reenter or reentry.”430 What is
interesting, and expands the scope of Texas law, is its applicability
to conduct occurring “between the launch and reentry,” which is not
mentioned in 51 U.S.C. section 50902, and post-landing activities.
The Texas legislature’s immunity therefore theoretically applies to a
broader scope of activities than those envisioned by federal law. And
for purposes of immunity, that is significant because if an operator
causes damages between launch and reentry, or during recovery,
and those damages affect another state, the operator may try to claim
immunity under Texas law, but would be unable to obtain indemnity
under federal law. This would make the immunity statute even more
important for operators in Texas, and may be an advantage of Texas
as compared to other states. Having said this, at this time, the federal
and Texas language are a distinction without a difference. For purposes
of suborbital flights, the end of the launch phase happens (almost) as
soon as the re-entry phase begins. Which means that for all intents and
purposes there is no “in-between” phase. But this might change as
space activities progress towards providing trips to the ISS or point-topoint transportation using suborbital trajectories.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 100A.001.
51 U.S.C. § 50902(4) (2010) (“activities involved in the preparation of a launch vehicle or payload
for launch”), § 50902(6) (“activities involved in the preparation of a launch vehicle, payload, crew
(including crew training), or space flight participant for launch”), and § 50902(14) (“activities
involved in the preparation of a launch vehicle, payload, crew (including crew training), or space
flight participant for reentry.”).
429
430
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Under Texas law, a spaceflight entity avails itself of statutory
immunity if the SFP signs the statutorily mandated language.431 The
statutory immunity applies to injuries or damage “arising out of the
space flight participant injury . . . .”432 The Space Activities Statute
therefore broadly applies to any injury to a spaceflight participant,
and does not limit its scope to “inherent risks” or even “risks arising
out of spaceflight activities.” Lastly, Texas provides no immunity if
a spaceflight entity acts with gross negligence, evidencing willful or
wanton disregard for the safety of the SFP or if it acts intentionally.433
It does, by implication, provide immunity for a spaceflight entities’
negligence.
2. Statutes Limiting Liability
As a general matter, Texas courts construe statutory limitations
on operator liability broadly. This broad approach makes it easier for
legislatures attempting to attract spaceflight entities to do so. Further,
this broad approach was reaffirmed in 2011 by the Texas Supreme
Court in Loftin v. Lee. If other courts adopt Loftin as a template for
interpreting statutory limitations on liability in Texas, the judiciary will
assist (rather than hinder) the legislature’s efforts to create a regime
favorable to spaceflight entities.
In Loftin the Texas Supreme Court held that for purposes of the
ELA, sponsor negligence is an “inherent risk” of equine activities, even
though the statute does not say that.434 This is a tremendous concession
to operators. The negligent operator in Loftin was the defendant.
The plaintiff and the defendant, who were friends, decided to go
horseback riding together.435 About an hour into the ride, the plaintiff
and the defendant came to a “wooded, boggy area.”436 The plaintiff
knew the low-lying area could be muddy.437 The defendant saw that
it actually was438 Nneither thought to avoid it.439 The defendant had
also noticed vines hanging from the trees and knew that a horse might
jump if something touched its flank.440 That is what happened, and the
horse bolted injuring the plaintiff.441 The trial court granted summary
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 100A.003 (West 2011).
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 100A.003.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 100A.001(b).
Loftin v. Lee, 341 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. 2011).
Id. at 354.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Loftin, 341 S.W.3d at 354.
Id. at 354–55.
Id. at 355.
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judgment for the defendant, holding that the ELA barred the plaintiff’s
claims.442 The court of appeals reversed and remanded.443 The Supreme
Court granted review.444
The Supreme Court rejected the proposition that a risk associated
with equine activity must be inevitable to be inherent.445 The Supreme
Court agreed that the plaintiff and the defendant could have avoided
boggy, wooded trails or they could have gone riding in West Texas.
Further, the court identified negligence on the defendant’s part because
she could have chosen a nearby trail free of the conditions that caused
the plaintiff’s fall.446 Even so, the Supreme Court reasoned, “the risks of
such choices are inherent in riding any trail.”447 And the risk inherent in
trail riding is that, “a horse will be spooked by natural conditions, if not
mud and vines, then birds or shadows.”448 Instead of looking behind
the reasons that caused the animal to spook, the Texas Supreme Court
limited its inquiry as to whether the actual injury was caused by an
inherent risk: an animal getting spooked, regardless of why.
It is important to note that the Colorado and Texas ELA’s are
quite similar. But contrary to the Colorado courts’ tack, the Texas
court read “inherent risk” in its ELA expansively. The Texas ELA
contains five examples of “inherent risks,” which echo those found
in the Colorado ELA—animal propensities and unpredictability, land
conditions, collisions, and other participants’ negligence. And just like
the Colorado list, the Texas list is “expressly non-exclusive.”449 But in
Texas, the Supreme Court read inherent risks broadly. And it did not
inquire about the cause of the horse’s reaction (a screaming girl or a
vine).
There are, of course, ways to distinguish the two cases. In Fielder the
animal was spooked because another rider made noise, not a natural
occurrence, while in Loftin the animal was spooked by a vine, a natural
occurrence. Nonetheless, the court in Loftin recognized a non-natural
occurrence at play—the defendant was negligent—and chose to ignore
it because the injury resulted from an inherent risk listed in the statute.
This, rather than the natural v. non-natural nature of the cause, was the
analytical pivot for the Supreme Court’s holding.
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449

Id.
Id.
Loftin, 341 S.W.3d at 355.
Id. at 358.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Loftin, 341 S.W.3d at 356.
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The legislature enacted the Space Activities Statute to create a prospaceflight entity regime in Texas and given the recent Supreme Court
decision, it may well have done so. Granted, the case law is scarce. But
what is available indicates that Texas courts apply the letter of the law,
with regards to statutes limiting liability, and are willing to dismiss
suits on that basis.
3. Express Assumption of Risk
Texas’s ELA is actually a statute limiting liability for animal farm
professionals and livestock show sponsors.450 This statute requires these
sponsors to post specifically worded warnings,451 but does not require
signature of any particular statement. On the other hand, as discussed
above, the Texas Space Activities Statute requires the following warning
to be signed by the SFP:
Agreement and Warning
I understand and acknowledge that
a space flight entity is not liable for
any injury to or death of a space flight
participant resulting from space flight
activities. I understand that I have
accepted all risk of injury, death, property
damage, and other loss that may result
from space flight activities.
Texas spaceflight entities will not be able to solely rely on the above
warning statement for exculpation. But minor adjustments will give
them the sought after immunity, given Texas’s robust framework for the
enforcement of exculpatory provisions. As a result, the Space Activities
Statute was not necessary to protect spaceflight entities. However,
the Texas legislature was the only one out of the six that addressed
the issue of exculpatory provisions in its text. The Texas legislature
included a provision stating that an exculpatory agreement between
an SFP and a spaceflight entities is “effective and enforceable and is not
unconscionable or against public policy.”452 This type of language can
assist parties enforcing exculpatory provisions and shows foresight
by the legislature as to the potential uses of the warning statement,
beyond mere compliance with the Space Activities Statute.
Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 94, “release” is an affirmative
450
451
452

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 87.005 (West 2011).
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 87.001.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 100A.004 (West 2011).
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defense.453 The effect of a release “is to relieve a party in advance of
responsibility for its own negligence.”454 Texas courts deem the defense
to “extinguish the claim or cause of action as effectively as would
a prior judgment between the parties and is an absolute bar to any
right of action on the released matter.”455 As a result, Texas courts will
enforce releases, including releases for a party’s own future negligence,
subject to “fair notice requirements.” “Because a pre-injury release of a
party’s ‘own negligence is an extraordinary shifting of risk, [the Texas
Supreme Court] has developed fair notice requirements which apply to
these types of agreements.’”456 The fair notice requirement has to satisfy
two elements: conspicuousness and the express negligence rule.457
Texas Business and Commerce Code section 1.201(10) has a
definition of “conspicuous.”458 A conspicuous term includes the
following:
(A)

a heading in capitals equal
to or greater in size than
the surrounding text, or in
contrasting type, font, or color to
the surrounding text of the same
or lesser size; and

(B)

language in the body of a record
or display in larger type than
the surrounding text, or in
contrasting type, font, or color to
the surrounding text of the same
size, or set off from surrounding
text of the same size by symbols
or other marks that call attention
to the language.459

The statute itself does not require a release to satisfy both subsections.460
Rather, these are just two possible ways for a release to be conspicuous.461
Tex. R. Civ. P. 94.
Quintana v. CrossFit Dallas, L.L.C., 347 S.W.3d 445, 449–50 (Tex. App. 2011) (quoting Dresser
Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex. 1993)).
455
Id. at 450.
456
Id. (quoting Dresser, 853 S.W.2d at 507).
457
Id. (citing Storage & Processors, Inc. v. Reyes, 134 S.W.3d 190, 192 (Tex. 2004).
458
Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 1.201(10) (2005).
459
Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 1.201(10) (West 2005) (emphases added).
460
See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 1.201(10) (West 2009); see also Quintana, 347 S.W.3d at 450.
461
Thom v. Rebel’s Honky Tonk, 03-11-00700-CV, 2013 WL 1748798 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 17,
2013).
453
454
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In addition, exculpatory provision can be conspicuous, even if not in
strict compliance with the Tex. Bus. & Com. Code.462 Conspicuousness,
more broadly defined, is satisfied if the release is “so written, displayed,
or presented that a reasonable person against which it is to operate
ought to have noticed it.”463 In addition, something is conspicuous if
“attention can reasonably be expected to be called to it”464 or when “a
reasonable person against whom a clause is to operate ought to have
noticed it.”465 The burden of proving “actual knowledge” is on the
party seeking release.466 Determination of whether a provision satisfies
these requirements is done as a matter of law.467
For example, an exculpatory provision is conspicuous if: 1) the
entire document is two pages long; 2) the word “release” is near the top
of the second page, is in larger type than any other text on that page, and
is bolded; 3) the release contains three paragraphs, for a total of twelve
lines of text, followed by a blank for the plaintiff’s initials.468 Similarly,
an exculpatory provision is conspicuous if it takes up an entire form,
which is dedicated to the release and assumption of risk.469 Further,
if the entire release “is wholly dedicated to warning . . . participants
of the dangers, instructing participants on the necessary precautions,
and informing participants of the rights they are waiving,”470 it is
conspicuous.
The Texas Supreme Court also provides guidance as to what type
of releases will fail the conspicuousness requirement. In Littlefield v.
Schaefer the invalidated release was: 1) six paragraphs of; 2) minuscule
type; 3) compressed into a 3” x 4.25” square; 4) in the lower corner
of a registration form.471 The heading of the Littlefield release was in
four-point font and contained 28 characters per inch.472 The main text
was printed in even smaller typeface and contained 38 characters per
inch.473 The Supreme Court described the text of the Littlefield release,
as “illegible,” “too small,” and “containing minuscule print,” holding
Quintana, 347 S.W.3d at 450; Thom, 2013 WL 1748798, at *5.
Quintana, 347 S.W.3d at 451 (citing Storage & Processors, Inc. v. Reyes, 134 S.W.3d 190, 192);
Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 511 (Tex. 1993); Sydlik v. REEIII, Inc.,
195 S.W.3d 329, 332–33 (Tex. App.—Hous. [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
464
Thom, 2013 WL 1748798, at *5 (citing Quintana, 347 S.W.3d at 450); Littlefield v. Schaefer, 955
S.W.2d 272, 275 (Tex. 1997)).
465
Thom, 2013 WL 1748798, at *5 (citing Dresser, 853 S.W.2d at 511; Quintana, 347 S.W.3d at 451).
466
Id.
467
Quintana, 347 S.W.3d at 450 (citing Dresser, 853 S.W.2d at 509).
468
Quintana, 347 S.W.3d at 451.
469
Thom, 2013 WL 1748798, at *4.
470
Id.
471
Id. at *4 (citing Littlefield v. Schaefer, 955 S.W.2d 272, 274 (Tex. 1997)).
472
Id.
473
Id.
462
463
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that, “Where a party is not able to know what the contract terms
are because they are unreadable, as a matter of law the exculpatory
clause will not be enforced.”474 The Space Activities Statute provides
no guidance about the conspicuousness of the warning statement. But
spaceflight entities can confidently rely on the common law’s clear and
specific guidance on the topic. The second element of the fair notice
requirement is satisfaction of the “express negligence” rule.
The “express negligence rule” provides that “if a party intends to
be released from its own future negligence it must express that intent in
clear, unambiguous terms within the four corners of the contract.”475 The
reason for having “the express negligence rule is to require scriveners
to make it clear when the intent of the parties is to exculpate” a party for
that party’s own negligence.”476 Specific reference to “any negligent act
of [the released party]” can be sufficient to define the parties’ intent.477
The express negligence rule is satisfied by language that specifically
states the plaintiff “assumes ‘any and all liability’ for ‘damages of any
kind’ ‘allegedly attributed to the negligent acts or omissions of’ [the
defendant] and its employees.”478 In this case, the specific reference to
the negligence of the defendant and its employees precludes the release
from being insufficiently precise.479
Texas courts will rule an exculpatory provision unenforceable if the
risk that causes the injury is outside the scope of the activity envisioned.
For example, in Jaeger v. Hartley a couple was injured while traversing a
canyon by car because the defendant’s employee was aware the car had
defective brakes but decided to proceed with the tour anyway.480 The
court held it reasonable to foresee an injury arising from traversing the
wilderness or canyon by car.481 But it was not reasonable to infer from
the release that part of the tour would include being driven around in
a car with defective brakes, and that the defendant’s employee would
continue the tour knowing about the defect.482 In other words, the court
added a requirement that the injury be reasonably foreseeable from the
Id. (quoting Littlefield, 955 S.W.2d at 275).
Quintana v. CrossFit Dallas, 347 S.W.3d 445, 450 (Tex. App.—Dall. 2011) (citing Storage &
Processors v. Reyes, 134 S.W.3d 190, 192 (Tex. 2004); Sydlik v. REEIII, Inc., 195 S.W.3d 329, 333
(Tex. App.—Hous. [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
476
Quintana, 347 S.W.3d at 450 (citing Atl. Richfield Co. v. Petroleum Pers., Inc., 768 S.W.2d 724,
726 (Tex. 1989)).
477
Id. (citing Atl. Richfield Co., 768 S.W.2d at 726 (insertion in original)).
478
Quintana, 347 S.W.3d at 452.
479
Id. at 451–52.
480
Jaeger v. Hartley, 394 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. App.—Amarillo [Panel D] 2013).
481
Id. at 794.
482
Id.
474
475
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text of the release.
To summarize, a spaceflight entity drafting an exculpatory provision
for enforcement in Texas has to satisfy the conspicuousness requirement
and the express negligence requirement. The Space Activities Statute
addresses neither requirement. So from that perspective, it does
nothing to ameliorate the common law. However, it also does nothing
to diminish the robust common law enforcement of exculpatory
provisions. Spaceflight entities should be able to avail themselves of
Texas’s generous law if they draft releases with reasonably-sized font,
in a legible document, and consisting of two pages or less. To satisfy
the express negligence requirement, spaceflight entities will have to
modify the Space Activities Statute warning language to explicitly
include the degrees of culpability for which they are being released.
4. Implied Assumption of Risk
Under Texas law, the assumption of risk defense can only be raised
by a co-participant in a sport. This is because, according to the Supreme
Court, Texas public policy demands that participants in athletic contests
be allowed to obtain summary disposition when they can show that
the injury resulted from a foreseeable and expected play to which all
participants in the sport were deemed to have consented.483 Spaceflight
activities are not a sport. Although Texas case law is scarce, the only
activities where assumption of risk was allowed as a defense involved
activities such as golfing and softball.484 And an SFP and the spaceflight
entity are not co-participants. So it is unlikely that spaceflight entities
can raise the defense of assumption of risk in response to a suit by an
SFP or an SFP’s family.
Further, the only defenses available are EAR and SAR.485 PAR was
abolished.486 EAR comes in two flavors. The first flavor is when the
plaintiff knowingly and expressly consents, either orally or in writing,
to the dangerous activity or condition.487 The second flavor is when
a party expressly consents to the conduct.488 Express consent, in the
Davis v. Greer, 940 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1996).
See, e.g., Allen v. Donath, 875 S.W.2d 438, 442 (Tex. App.—Waco 1994, writ denied) (applying
assumption of risk to a golfing accident); Davis, 940 S.W.2d at 582–83 (applying assumption of risk
to a softball injury).
485
Allen, 875 S.W.2d at 443 (citing Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex. 1975)).
486
Id.
487
Id.; Thom, 2013 WL 1748798, at *7; Willis v. Willoughby, 202 S.W.3d 450, 453 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2006, pet. denied) (concluding that claimant contractually assumed risk of engaging in
self-defense instruction, which she expressly agreed was inherently dangerous activity); Newman
v. Tropical Visions, Inc., 891 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, writ denied) (citing
Farley, 529 S.W.2d at 758).
488
Davis, 940 S.W.2d 582 (citing Farley, 529 S.W.2d at 758).
483
484
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context of sports, is evidenced by mere participation: “A participant
in a competitive contact sport expressly consents to and assumes
the risk of the dangerous activity by voluntarily participating in the
sport.”489 Participation, however, does not assume the risk of reckless
or intentional conduct.490
With respect to SAR, Texas courts say that Texas does not recognize
the defense. And in fact, they use different terminology to describe
the concept. But the case law evidences the continuing vitality of
“qualified” SAR (i.e. implied assumption of risk when the plaintiff
acts reasonably). For example, in Allen v. Donath the Court of Appeals
attempted to distinguish what it referred to as “implied” assumption
of risk, which it was applying in the case at bar, and “voluntary”
assumption of risk, which—it conceded—the Supreme Court
abolished. “This implied assumption of risk differs from the voluntary
assumption of risk doctrine that has been merged into our system of
comparative negligence.”491 The court tried to explain the distinction
as follows. Implied assumption of risk was not an affirmative defense,
like voluntary assumption of risk, whereby a defendant sought to
prove that it was relieved of a duty.492 Rather, implied assumption of
risk involved a situation where a plaintiff voluntarily encountered a
known danger, but did not act unreasonably in doing so.493 The court
of appeals was, despite its best intentions, using the term “voluntary
assumption of risk” to describe PAR, and “implied assumption of risk”
to describe SAR.494 And as a result, allowing “qualified” SAR to survive,
while confirming the demise of PAR and of “strict or pure” SAR.
Under qualified SAR, a plaintiff assumes the “inherent” risks of an
activity. Under Texas law, an “inherent” risk is “a foreseeable and not
uncommon occurrence in [the activity].”495 The Supreme Court in part
rejected a subjective standard because such a standard would focus
on the defendant’s state of mind. And allowing this would make it
too easy for a plaintiff to raise a fact question as to the defendant’s
state of mind, thereby always foreclosing summary judgment.496 Using
this standard, courts are not required to determine the defendant’s
subjective state of mind, but instead concern themselves only with
Id. (quoting Connell v. Payne, 814 S.W.2d 486, 488–89 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, writ denied)).
Davis, 940 S.W.2d 582 (quoting Connell, 814 S.W.2d at 488–89).
491
Allen, 875 S.W.2d at 442.
492
Id. at 439–40.
493
Id.
494
Allen, 875 S.W.2d at 439–40.
495
See, e.g., Allen, 875 S.W.2d at 442 (applying assumption of risk to a golfing accident) (emphases
added); Davis, 940 S.W.2d at 582–83.
496
Davis, 940 S.W.2d at 582.
489
490
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the objective determination of whether the actions were foreseeable or
expected in the course of the particular sporting event.497
This is a different standard than the one encountered in any other
state reviewed so far. It is also arguably more flexible. It may, however,
also be irrelevant. The Texas Space Activities Statute immunizes
spaceflight entities’ from liability for injuries “arising out of the space
flight participant injury” (sic). Therefore, regardless of whether the
injury is inherent or foreseeable, if it arises out of spaceflight activities,
it is covered by the Texas Space Activities Statute.
Overall, Texas common law is not particularly advantageous to
defendants. First, Texas abolished PAR, foreclosing disposal of claims
at the summary judgment stage. Second, SAR is applied narrowly
to contact and non-contact sports. Even though one case, Jaeger,
applied the doctrine to a jeep tour, the case was otherwise incorrectly
decided, and this could weigh against it being used as precedent.498
Further, Texas courts have largely applied SAR to co-participants.
And although no case holds it improper to apply SAR to operators—
indeed, SAR was applied to an operator-defendant in Jaeger—having
better precedent to that effect would be superior evidence of Texas
jurisprudence. Lastly, SAR has been applied to “contact” and “noncontact” sports. It is unclear whether spaceflight activities fit that
definition, although arguably spaceflight activities are a non-contact
sport. One good (although likely irrelevant) aspect of Texas law is its
definition of “inherent” as foreseeable. This is an objective standard,
which does not rely on the parties’ state of mind. It is also broader than
other definitions of “inherent” found in the other states reviewed. The
Texas Space Activities Statute achieves the legislature’s goal because
it does decrease spaceflight entities’ exposure to liability. Under the
common law, spaceflight entities are not clearly entitled to raise the
only available bar to recovery, which is participatory EAR. Therefore,
codifying a version of PAR the way the Texas legislature did, does
improve on the available common law.
F. Virginia
1. Space Activities Statute
In Virginia the term “space flight entity” includes the FAA license
holder, as well as manufacturers and suppliers reviewed by the FAA
Id. at 582–83.
Jaeger v. Hartley, 394 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. App.—Amarillo [Panel D] 2013) (citing Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Alexander, 868 S.W.2d 322, 326 (Tex. 1993)).
497
498
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during the licensing process.499 Virginia succinctly adopts the Launch
Act’s definitions of SFP and spaceflight activities.500
Virginia requires a spaceflight entity to obtain informed consent
under federal law and informed consent under its own Space Activities
Statute.501 Although the latter term is undefined, it is presumably fulfilled
by obtaining the signed statutorily mandated warning statement.502 If
a spaceflight entity complies with these requirements, it is immune
from suit by anyone attempting to recover for injuries “resulting from
the risks of space flight.”503 Virginia, therefore, also does not use the
limited term “inherent risk” but rather adopts a broader approach to
immunity.
Virginia does not extend immunity for a spaceflight entity that
commits an act or omission that constitutes either gross negligence
or willful or wanton disregard for an SFP’s safety.504 And of course,
Virginia does not immunize a spaceflight entity’s commission of
intentional acts.505
2. Statutes Limiting Liability
Virginia statutory law is replete with statutes limiting liability for
particular activities. The Virginia legislature has passed a Winter Sports
Safety Act,506 an Agritourism Activity Liability,507 and a Marine Tourism
Activity Liability,508 but Virginia has no case law interpreting these
statutes. Therefore, despite their existence, they provide no guidance to
interpreting the Space Activities Statute, and as far as Virginia courts’
treatment of the Space Activities Statute goes, at this point anything is
possible.
3. Express Assumption of Risk
In Virginia, pre-injury exculpatory clauses for future negligence
are unenforceable because always void as against public policy.509 The
Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-227.8.
Id.
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Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-227.9(A).
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Id.
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Id.
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Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-227.9.
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Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-227.12 (2012).
507
Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6402.
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Va. Code Ann. § 28.2-1107 (2009).
509
See Hiett v. Lake Barcroft Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., 418 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1992); Johnson’s Adm’x v.
Richmond & D.R. Co., 11 S.E. 829, 829 (Va. 1890); Estes Express Lines, Inc. v. Chopper Express,
Inc., 641 S.E.2d 476, 479 (Va. 2007).
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Virginia Supreme Court made its pronouncement in 1890 and reiterated
it, unwaveringly, in 1992 and 2007.510 In 1992, the Virginia Supreme
Court emphasized that its invalidation of an exculpatory provision was
based on the fact that “such provisions for release from liability for
personal injury which may be caused by future acts of negligence are
prohibited “universally.”511 And in 2007, the Supreme Court reiterated
the vitality of its previous holdings because “such provisions cannot be
tolerated under an enlightened system of jurisprudence.”512
A spaceflight entity will not be able to rely on an exculpatory
provision to bar suits by SFPs seeking to recover from spaceflight
entities in Virginia. Therefore, spaceflight entities will need to rely
entirely on either the statute—for which there is no comparable case
law—or the common law, where contributory negligence still exists.
4. Implied Assumption of Risk
Virginia is atypical because it is the only state, out of the six, and
only one of six nationwide, that still has contributory negligence.
Contributory negligence entirely bars a plaintiff’s recovery if the
plaintiff was negligent. Such a showing would bar the suit altogether
at the complaint stage, “where a plaintiff’s complaint shows on its face
that the plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence, the complaint
should be dismissed on demurrer.”513 Virginia also bars a plaintiff’s
recovery if he assumed the risks inherent in the given activity.
Virginia courts view it as “axiomatic” that participation in certain
sports or recreational activities necessarily involves the exposure of the
participant to the risks of injury inherent in such activities.514 Skiing and
snow tubing are but a few examples of such recreational activities.515
Indeed, in the context of snow tubing, the Virginia Supreme Court noted
that, based on common experience, the known and accepted inherent
risks of a particular recreational activity provide, in part, “the allure
510
Johnson’s Adm’x, 11 S.E. at 829 (Va. 1890); Hiett, 418 S.E.2d at 895–96 (citing and quoting Johnson’s
Adm’x, 11 S.E. at 829); Estes Express Lines, 641 S.E.2d at 479.
511
Hiett, 418 S.E.2d at 895–96 (citing and quoting Johnson’s Adm’x, 11 S.E. at 829).
512
Estes Express Lines, 641 S.E.2d at 479. For an outlier case, see Morrison v. Star City Roller
Skating Centers, Inc., 26 Va. Cir. 335 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1992). The plaintiff injured herself while roller
skating. The defendant tried to enforce the release the plaintiff had signed, the trial court did so
finding “no public policy reason” to deny enforcement. Id. at 335. This trial court level decision is
included for completeness but has no precedential effect, given the clear Supreme Court holdings
to the contrary.
513
Chilton v. Homestead, L.C., 79 Va. Cir. 708 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2008) (citing Chesapeake & O. Ry. v.
Swartz, 80 S.E. 568 (Va. 1914)).
514
Nelson v. Great E. Resort Mgmt., Inc., 574 S.E.2d 277, 280 (2003).
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and thrill of participation in the activity.”516 Under Virginia law, this is
precisely the context in which the duty of care owed by the operator of a
recreational facility to its invitee and participant in a particular activity
is tempered, “by the common law principle volenti non fit injuria-one
who consents cannot be injured.”517 However, although this language
seems to fully support—and even render obsolete—the legislature’s
efforts in the Space Activities Act, implementation of these concepts
by the courts in fact indicates that the Space Activities Act was a much
needed improvement to spaceflight entities’ position.
Under Virginia law, the doctrine of assumption of risk differs from
contributory negligence because the plaintiff must fully appreciate the
nature and extent of the risk and voluntarily incur that risk.518 In that
sense, it is an affirmative defense premised on a primarily subjective
test, rather than the objective reasonable person test applicable to
contributory negligence.519 The defendant has to show “what the
particular plaintiff in fact sees, knows, understands and appreciates.”520
However, while the degree or scope of the injured participant’s consent
is frequently an issue, under Virginia law, “the operator of a recreational
facility is not an insurer of the safety of its invitees.”521 Although the
Virginia courts refer to this as “primary” or “implied” assumption
of risk, it is more fairly labeled SAR.522 And it is, in reality, “pure” or
“strict” SAR because the plaintiff’s actions must have been blameless,
i.e. reasonable.
The plaintiff in Nelson v. Great E. Resort Mgmt., Inc. was injured
when she collided with another snow tubing ride. According to the
Supreme Court, the issue of assumption of risk was patent from the
factual circumstances established by the evidence. The plaintiff had
assumed the risk of injury resulting from a ride down a steep incline.523
But the plaintiff was not injured as a result of the speed of her ride; she
was injured by a collision with another rider.524 The Supreme Court held
that the issue jury determination was whether the plaintiff subjectively
assumed the risk of injury in that manner.525
The Virginia Space Activities Statute provides that any limitations
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
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Id.
Id. (citing Landes v. Arehart, 183 S.E.2d 127, 129 (1971)).
Nelson, 574 S.E.2d at 280.
Id. (quoting Amusement Slides Corp. v. Lehmann, 232 S.E.2d 803, 805 (1977)).
Id. (internal citation omitted).
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Nelson, 574 S.E.2d at 281 (internal citation omitted).
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on liability afforded under it are “in addition to any other limitations
of legal liability otherwise provide by law.”526 This is an odd statement.
The Space Activities Statute assumes there are other limitations on a
spaceflight entities’ liability. But research uncovered none. Exculpatory
provisions are unenforceable as a matter of law, so EAR cannot apply
because Virginia courts don’t recognize it. PAR does not exist. And
SAR is so narrowly construed that it would only apply in limited
circumstances, which fall far below the Space Activities Statute on the
scale of possible exculpation. As a result, the statement may have been
meant as a “savings clause” but its effectiveness is dubious.
Virginia common law is only really protective of spaceflight entities
if a plaintiff is negligent under contributory negligence. But in the
absence of such negligence, a spaceflight entity would have to show
the plaintiff was subjectively aware of the risk that caused the injury
and chose to proceed anyway. This is more difficult to do. Indeed, in
many cases, it will preclude application of assumption of risk. If that
is the case, the parties would proceed to an apportionment of liability.
The scarce case law on assumption of risk does not provide guidance
as to the adequacy of the Space Activities Act. But given the subjective
standard employed to determine a plaintiff’s actual assumption
of a known and appreciated risk, the Space Activities Statute is an
improvement on the common law, because it codifies PAR. PAR under
the Space Activities Statute removes an operator’s duties to protect an
SFP from inherent risks of spaceflight activities. And it does not require
a subjective understanding of those risks. All it requires is a signed
warning statement. The substitution of the common law subjective
test with the statutory objective is conducive to actually achieving the
legislature’s goal of limiting liability for spaceflight entities.
Conclusion
The Six Space Friendly States view and use statutes limiting
liability in dramatically different ways. This is in large part because
each jurisdiction views the statute as expressing a particular legislative
policy. And each set of courts reacts to that actual or perceived policy
differently. As an example, Colorado courts interpret immunizing
statutes very narrowly and have fought the legislature on statutes like
the SLA, resisting attempts to limit operator liability.
Further, the statutes vary slightly one from another, further
creating room for creative differences among jurisdictions. In
addition, the Space Activities Statutes themselves may present some
526
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unanticipated challenges resulting from either internal inconsistencies
or inconsistencies with the existing common law. For example, the
California Space Activities Statute spaceflight operators are given
immunity for, “participant injury that resulted from the risks associated
with space flight activities . . . .”527 But the statutorily mandated warning
statement refers to the SFP’s understanding and acknowledgment of
“inherent risks.” Courts will have to tackle the inconsistency. The New
Mexico Space Activities Statute seems to only immunize spaceflight
entities if the injury results “exclusively” from the risks inherent to
spaceflight activities, which is an odd limitation. Virginia states that
the Space Activities Statute is “in addition to” any other limitation
available at common law, but it is unclear whether any such limitation
actually exists. In other words, the statutes do not necessarily remove
ambiguities and in fact, in some cases, create them.
Further, although none of the Space Activities Statutes provide
warning language enforceable as a standalone exculpatory provision,
in some states the mere existence of the Space Activities Statute will
negatively impact the way courts enforce independently drafted
releases. This is the case in New Mexico, where the New Mexico
Supreme Court interpreted the existence of an immunizing statute as
creating a ceiling on the scope of independently drafted exculpatory
provisions. At the opposite end of the spectrum, Colorado interprets the
language of an immunizing statute as a floor on operator exculpation.
And Texas, the standout state, specifically encourages courts to enforce
spaceflight exculpatory provisions by legislatively pronouncing them
enforceable, effective, and not against public policy.
In addition, in some states the Space Activities Statute is a gesture of
goodwill towards spaceflight entities but it does not actually enhance
a spaceflight entity’s defenses because the common law would likely
have been protective enough. This is certainly the case in California,
where courts—even in the absence of statutes immunizing operators
of recreational activities—have historically been very protective of
defendants. In Texas, courts enforce releases if they comply with the
fair notice requirements, and do so even for a defendant’s negligence.
In those circumstances, the Space Activities Statutes does not supplant,
but neither does it really supplement the robust common law on
releases. In Colorado, the Supreme Court already pronounced that
the language of the ELA warning statement, which is near-identical
to the Space Activities Statute’s warning language, does not protect
an operator from liability for its own negligence, thereby sinking the
527
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Space Activities Statute’s warning statement before it is even used.
In some cases, being excluded from the Space Activities Statute has
actually been a greater benefit than being included in it. In California,
manufacturers of recreational activities can rely on the PAR defense to
bar claims, because they are allowed to do so under the common law
and they were specifically excluded from the Space Activities Statute.
The Space Activities Statute would have weakened the manufacturers’
position by only offering them immunity under certain circumstances
and not incorporating the words “inherent risk” in the statute’s scope.
Legislatures also failed to address known weaknesses of each of
their common law regimes when they drafted their respective Space
Activities Statutes. The following are just a few salient examples. In
Virginia, courts do not enforce exculpatory provisions as a matter of
law. The Virginia legislature could have attempted to remedy this.
In Colorado, courts will reach back into the chain of causation to
determine whether the inherent risk was the sole cause of the injury or
whether something else cause the inherent risk to take place. The Space
Activities Statute relies on the concept of inherent risk but doesn’t define
it. This shifts application and contouring of inherent risk to the federal
informed consent process, where SFP’s have to be informed of hazards
associated with spaceflight activities. As discussed, New Mexico courts
use statutes providing immunity as ceilings on exculpatory provisions.
The New Mexico legislature did not address this. And unwittingly
limited parties’ freedom to contractually exculpate each other. The
New Mexico legislature also did not clearly describe the degree of
culpability for which it sought to immunize spaceflight entities. This is
not a result of the language “knows or has reason to know,” but rather
of the New Mexico courts’ murky interpretation of the term, and varied
application in civil and criminal contexts.
In some states, the Space Activities Statute would have been
very beneficial because the common law is not. Yet, the promise may
remain unfulfilled. Florida, for example, would most benefit from a
robust immunity statute because the common law is among the least
advantageous to spaceflight entities. This is because Florida courts
have been unenthusiastic about enforcing liability limiting statutes,
have interpreted the term “inherent risk” narrowly, usually finding
against exculpation, and Florida only recognizes participatory EAR as
an assumption of risk defense, which only applies to situations that
do not encompass spaceflight entities or spaceflight activities. But the
Florida Space Activities Statute fails to immunize spaceflight entities
for any degree of culpability. Thereby codifying something less than
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PAR and leaving spaceflight entities only marginally better off than at
common law.
This is not to say the Space Activities Statutes are not an
improvement on the common law. In certain states, they clearly are.
This is specifically the case where states abolished the PAR defense.
Because although the Space Activities Statutes are not across the bar
codifications of PAR, they are at least an attempt to codify a PARlight defense. Texas is a notable, although not unique, example. Texas
courts could only apply participatory EAR to spaceflight participants,
because PAR and SAR don’t squarely apply. And participatory EAR is
very narrowly construed. In light of this, the Space Activities Statute
is in fact an improvement on Texas law for spaceflight entities. This
is also the case in Florida and Virginia where courts will only allow
an assumption of risk defense if the plaintiff was subjectively aware
of the precise danger encountered and chose to encounter it with
that knowledge and subjective appreciation. States that only apply
assumption of risk to sports or participants are also states where Space
Activities Statutes are, at least to some degree, an improvement for
spaceflight entities. In addition, states like Virginia where pre-injury
releases are against public policy as a matter of law certainly create a
more welcoming atmosphere by enacting the Space Activities Statute.
In conclusion, Space Activities Statutes are not the end all be all
of immunity. They are more fairly characterized as imperfect attempts
to attract spaceflight entities. And their relative success and utility is
highly contingent on each state’s jurisprudence and policy. Even where
Space Activities Statutes are an improvement on the common law, they
are a slight improvement. And could use revisions to truly fulfill the
promise of limited liability. Indeed, in order for legislatures to obtain
the sought after results, they will have to analyze judicial decisions and
work backwards towards the legislative text. This will have to be done,
of course, while balancing resistance and input from other stakeholders.
Finally, spaceflight entities should carefully consider whether to
supplement statutorily mandated warning statements. None of the six
Space Activities Statutes provide language sufficient to be enforced
as a standalone exculpatory provision. To this end, spaceflight
entities can take solace in case law from states that approve of parties
supplementing statutorily mandated warnings, like Colorado. And
take note of the Texas Space Activities Statute which expressly refers to
the validity and enforceability of exculpatory provisions between SFPs
and spaceflight entities
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So to answer the question driving the inquiry, “Is Statutory
Immunity for Spaceflight Entities Good Enough?” The answer is: No,
with the qualifier that this assessment is based on prediction. And as
all predictions go, it is only as good as the materials available at this
time. Further, judges and policies change over time. And it may also
be that, due to politics and economics, spaceflight entities may be able
to encourage changes to the Space Activities Statutes or present strong
arguments that public policy favors and justifies limiting their liability.

